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DISCOUNTS AND BUYOUTS IN MINORITY 
INVESTOR LLC VALUATION DISPUTES 
INVOLVING OPPRESSION OR DIVORCE 
Sandra K. Miller* 
This paper highlights the need for guidance on how to value a 
minority LLC interest in a court-ordered buyout resulting from the exercise 
of LLC dissenters’ rights, an oppression suit, or an action seeking an 
equitable distribution of property in a divorce.  The Model Business 
Corporation Act prohibits both the “minority discount” reflecting the 
minority’s lack of voting control and the “marketability discount” 
adjusting for the limited illiquid market of a private firm.  The American 
Law Institute in the Principles of Corporate Governance and the Uniform 
Partnership Act recommend disregarding the minority discount and the 
marketability discount as a general rule, but recognize limited exceptions 
for the marketability discount.  This paper advances arguments in favor of 
prohibiting both discounts in the valuation of an LLC.  A contextual 
judicial approach to valuation is recommended as are amendments to the 
Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act and state LLC statutes in 
order to authorize an election in lieu of a judicial dissolution to foster fair 
and speedy resolutions of member conflicts. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The question of whether there has been unfairly prejudicial or 
oppressive conduct on the part of a majority LLC member is just the first 
issue that courts must address in resolving a dispute among warring LLC 
members.
1
  Frequently, a court-ordered buyout will be the most appropriate 
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Haynesworth IV, Chair of the Committee on Business Entity Harmonization; Douglas Moll, 
Professor, University of Houston Law Center; and Richard J. Thomas, CPA and Director of 
Certified Valuation for Elko & Associates, for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of 
this article.  The author also thanks Nicole Philips for her excellent research assistance. 
 1. See generally F. HODGE O‘NEAL & ROBERT THOMPSON, F. HODGE O‘NEAL & 
THOMPSON‘S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC MEMBERS (2d ed. 2010) 
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remedy. Very quickly the conflict can shift from whether the minority 
should be bought out to what amount the minority should be paid.
2
  What 
guidelines should be established for determining the buyout price in the 
absence of a controlling LLC agreement?  Should the buyout price be 
adjusted downward to reflect the facts that a minority interest lacks voting 
control and that the company is private rather than public with a limited 
number of buyers?
3
 
Assume, for example, that a 75% majority owner squeezes out the 
25% minority member after the minority has a conflict with the majority 
owner‘s son.  Stripped of his role in management, and facing a dramatic 
reduction in salary and distributions, the minority owner institutes a suit 
alleging that the majority has engaged in oppressive conduct.  Assuming 
 
(providing an overview of legal issues affecting minority investors in private companies).  
See also JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COX & HAZEN ON CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 
2003) (offering a review of legal issues concerning public and private corporations); 
ROBERT A. RAGAZZO & DOUGLAS K. MOLL, CLOSELY HELD BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS:  
CASES, MATERIALS & PROBLEMS (West Publishing 2006) (providing a detailed analysis of 
the vulnerability of minority owners in private firms and squeeze-out problems). 
 2. A number of corporate statutes facilitate buyouts by containing an election to 
purchase the corporation‘s stock in which case the petition for dissolution of the corporation 
will be dismissed.  See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.34 (2006) (describing election to 
purchase in lieu of dissolution); infra Appendix E (providing a multi-state chart of 
corporate, partnership, and LLC statutes that provide guidelines for the judicial dissolution).  
States that offer express statutory buyout guidelines for corporations include Alaska, 
Arizona, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Rhode 
Island, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming.  A much smaller number of states provide such 
guidelines in their LLC statutes.  LLC statutes with buyout guidelines include California, 
Illinois, Minnesota, North Dakota, and Utah.  Virtually all states have some language in 
their partnership statutes authorizing buyouts.  See Harry J. Haynsworth, The Effectiveness 
of Involuntary Dissolution Suits as a Remedy for Close Corporation Dissension, 35 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 25, 53 (1987) (presenting an empirical study of thirty-seven suits for a judicial 
dissolution and finding that a majority culminated in a court-ordered buyout). 
 3. The minority discount provides a downward adjustment in value to reflect the fact 
that the owner of a minority interest in the LLC lacks majority control to influence the 
firm‘s affairs.  A discount in marketability offers a downward adjustment to reflect the fact 
that there is not a ready market on which to sell the interests in an LLC.  See SHANNON P. 
PRATT, ROBERT F. REILLY, & ROBERT P. SCHWEIHS, VALUING A BUSINESS: THE ANALYSIS 
AND APPRAISAL OF CLOSELY HELD COMPANIES 298-365 (3rd ed. 1996) (discussing minority 
interest discounts, control premiums, and other discounts including the lack of marketability 
discount).  See also Bernier v. Bernier, 873 N.E. 2d 216, 222-224 (Mass. 2007) (considering 
discrepancies in value due to discounts and distinguishing fair value from fair market 
value); Marsh v. Billington Farms, LLC, C.A. No. PB 04-3123, 2007 R.I. Super. LEXIS 
105, at *12-13 (R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 2007) (concluding without discussing that the pro 
rata valuation approach should be taken to a buyout of an LLC interest as the result of 
oppressive conduct); Douglas Moll, Shareholder Oppression and “Fair Value”: Of 
Discounts, Dates, and Dastardly Deeds in the Close Corporation, 54 DUKE L. REV. 293, 297 
(2004) (discussing the valuation issues in the context of disputes between shareholders of 
closely-held companies). 
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that the court decides not to liquidate the business, but to order the majority 
to buy out the minority interest, how should the court determine the buyout 
price absent a contractual arrangement?  Should the buyout price be based 
upon a strict 25% of value of the LLC?  Alternatively should the price be 
less than 25% of the company to reflect the minority‘s lack of voting 
control?  Arguably a ―willing‖ buyer would pay a ―willing‖ seller less than 
this full 25% and would want the price to reflect a ―minority discount.‖  
Should the buyout price be reduced to reflect the lack of a ready market for 
such private companies?  Does it make a difference if this is not a ―willing‖ 
sale?
4
  Should fault matter?  Does the context matter?  Should a different 
result occur if the valuation is being done in connection with a divorce?  
What if minority oppression is not involved but instead, the minority 
opportunistically uses a relatively insignificant reorganizational change as a 
pretext for triggering statutory dissenters‘ rights?  Should the interests of 
third parties in the continuing financial viability of the LLC be factored 
into the buyout terms?  What if the payment terms would strip the business 
of its working capital?  What are the social and/or economic policy 
interests at stake? 
As LLC filings soar, courts and arbitrators will have to make these 
difficult decisions with increasing frequency.
5
  The LLC valuation 
questions will emerge as questions of first impression as courts struggle to 
interpret statutory and judicial corporate and/or partnership precedents for 
guidance.  The trouble is that most LLC statutes fail to provide guidance on 
valuation approaches, and there are subtle conflicts in the messages sent 
from the corporate and partnership arenas.  While the Model Business 
Corporation Act broadly prohibits both the ―minority discount‖ and the 
―marketability discount‖ in the definition of ―fair value‖ governing the 
purchase in lieu of a judicial dissolution,
6
 the Principles of Corporate 
Governance
7
 and the Uniform Partnership Act
8
 acknowledge the possibility 
 
 4. See Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983) (indicating that the 
dissenting shareholder is entitled to be paid ―that which has been taken from him, viz, his 
proportionate interest in a going concern.‖). 
 5. See Michael K. Molitor, Eat Your Vegetables (or at Least Understand Why You 
Should): Can Better Warning and Education of Prospective Minority Owners Reduce 
Oppression in Closely-Held Businesses? 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 491, 496-97 (2009) 
(suggesting special steps to educate owners of small LLCs and to compile statistical data on 
the contractual choices made by LLC owners). 
 6. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.34 (2006) (authorizing a buyout in lieu of a 
judicial dissolution); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.01(4) at 13-3 (1998) (providing 
guidelines for determining fair value defined as ―the value of the corporation‘s shares . . . 
using customary and current valuation concepts . . . without discounting for lack of 
marketability or minority status‖).  See also Brown v. Arp. & Hammond Hardware Co., 141 
P.3d 673, 684-685 (Wyo. 2006) (offering a superb history of the valuation guidelines 
contained in the Model Business Corporation Act). 
 7. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:   
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of exceptions for the marketability discount in extraordinary circumstances. 
The Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (RULLCA) has a 
judicial dissolution provision, but one that does not contain guidelines on 
buyouts in lieu of dissolutions.
9
  Should RULLCA be amended to include 
such guidance, and if so, how should the minority and marketability 
discount issues be addressed? Recent literature has focused upon the 
appropriate methodology for determining the value of a corporation as a 
whole, but not on the next question of whether minority and marketability 
discounts should apply once the underlying value of the entity is 
determined, particularly where the entity is an LLC.
10
 
Following introductory comments in Part I and II, Part III considers 
the LLC statutory buy-out provisions.  Part IV discusses the corporate and 
partnership case law dealing with the minority discount, the corporate and 
partnership precedents regarding the marketability discount, and the 
emerging LLC case law addressing both types of discounts.  Arguing for a 
contextual approach, Part V explores the policy interests at stake in LLC 
oppression and dissenters‘ rights cases, many of which are shared by 
corporations and other business entities.  Consistent with both the Revised 
Uniform Partnership Act and the Principles of Corporate Governance, this 
paper supports a general rule prohibiting the minority and marketability 
discounts in LLC oppression and dissenters‘ rights cases and in connection 
with divorce.  Part VI recommends that the Revised Uniform Limited 
Liability Company Act be amended to provide a purchase in lieu of a 
 
STANDARD FOR DETERMINING FAIR VALUE § 7.22 (2010) (defining that fair value should be 
calculated as the eligible holder‘s proportionate interest in the corporation without any 
discount for lack of marketability, ―absent extraordinary circumstances‖). 
 8. See UNIF. P‘SHIP ACT § 7.01(b), cmt. no. 3 (1997) (discussing that while ―[t]he 
notion of a minority discount in determining the buyout price is negated by valuing the 
business as a going concern . . . [o]ther discounts, such as for a lack of marketability . . . 
may be appropriate . . . .‖). 
 9. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 701 (2006) (providing for a judicial 
dissolution or other remedies in the event of illegal, fraudulent or oppressive conduct, but 
not containing an express provision for a buyout in lieu of a dissolution with guidance on 
how the buyout price should be determined). 
 10. See Steven G. (Buzz) Durio, Discounts in Business Valuations After Cannon v. 
Bertrand, 57 LA. BAR J. 24, 27-28 (2009) (observing that where a partner withdraws from a 
partnership and the partnership continues and the remaining partners have an equal say or 
where an LLC member withdraws and the remaining LLC continues, a convincing argument 
can be made that the minority discount should not apply); Lawrence A. Hamermesh & 
Michael L. Wachter, Rationalizing Appraisal Standards in Compulsory Buyouts, 50  B.C. L. 
REV. 1021, 1022 (2009) (endorsing Delaware‘s determination of  a corporation‘s ―fair 
value‖ as going concern value under the corporate appraisal statute but not addressing the 
debate regarding the minority and marketability discounts arising in buyouts of small private 
partnerships or LLCs); Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression in Texas Close 
Corporations: Majority Rule (Still) Isn’t What It Used to Be, 9 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 33, 
60 (2008) (discussing valuation issues for small private firms). 
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judicial dissolution with a general prohibition on minority and 
marketability discounts. 
II. THE DISCOUNTS, THE PRO RATA APPROACH, AND THE VARIABLE 
NATURE OF LLC INTERESTS 
To properly value an LLC interest in a judicial buy-out, it is essential 
to understand the nature of the discounts, the unique features of the LLC, 
the competing valuation approaches, and the relevant LLC, corporate, and 
partnership statutory environments.  Part A below explores the different 
discounts.  Also, it discusses the corporate-style pro rata approach to 
valuation.  Part B discusses the hybrid features of the LLC and the unique 
contractual nature of the LLC interest. 
A.  “Fair Market Value,” “Fair Value,” and Discounts 
Courts have largely defined ―fair market value‖ as the price that a 
willing buyer would pay a willing seller in the relevant marketplace with 
neither being under a compulsion to enter into the sale.
11
  In the context of a 
purchase of stock, for instance, the ―fair market value‖ would be the 
owner‘s proportionate interest in the corporation multiplied by the value of 
the corporation, plus or minus any premiums or discounts that would be 
reflected in the market.
12
  Thus, the ―fair market value‖ of the interest 
owned by a 25% stockholder of a company worth $1,000,000 would be 
$250,000 plus or minus any relevant premiums or discounts that take into 
account special aspects of the seller‘s particular shares.  In contrast, ―fair 
value‖ does not consider market-related factors that could affect value in 
the particular hands of a specific owner.  Instead, ―fair value‖ considers 
only ―the proportionate interest in a going concern.‖
13
  Thus, one need 
 
 11. See First W. Bank Wall v. Olsen, 2001 SD 16, 621 N.W. 2d 611 (explaining that, 
with respect to a valuation dispute in the context of the exercise of dissenters‘ rights, 
―[i]nitially, it bears repeating that we are bound by what the legislature has written‖ (citing 
State Subsequent Injury Fund v. Federated Mut. Ins., Inc., 2000 SD 11, 605 N.W.2d 166, 
169)).  ―If the legislature intended dissenting shareholders to receive the fair market value of 
their shares, it would have so stated.  The reason the legislature did not use the term fair 
market value is obvious.  Fair market value has often been defined as the price a willing 
buyer would pay a willing seller, both under no obligation to act.‖ First W. Bank Wall, 621 
N.W. 2d at 617 (citing Zochert v. Nat‘l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas., 1998 SD 34, 576 
N.W.2d 531, 534).  See also Rev. Rul. 59-60 1959-1 C.B. 237 (discussing the IRS‘ 
definition of ―fair market value‖ as the price that a willing buyer will pay a willing seller, 
neither being under a compulsion to sell, and both having a reasonable knowledge of 
relevant facts). 
 12. Moll, supra note 3, at 296-97. 
 13. Id.  See also Brown v. Allied Corrugated Box Co., Inc., 91 Cal. App. 3d 477, 486 
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (refusing to devalue the corporation for a minority discount); 
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establish only the value of the company and the ownership percentage— 
$1,000,000 times 25% without considering any special market adjustments 
that might come into play in the hands of the stockholder. 
There are many different types of discounts recognized by valuation 
experts.  There is a discount for voting versus nonvoting minority shares.
14
  
Discounts are recognized for the loss of a key person, known as the ―Key 
Person‖ discount.
15
  Discounts have been recognized for fractional interests 
in real estate.  One study for instance covered the sales of 54 undivided 
interests in real estate and revealed a median discount of 30 percent.
16
  The 
most common discounts that arise in the context of controversies involving 
closely-held business disputes include the minority discount and the lack of 
marketability discount. 
1.   The Minority Discount 
The minority discount takes into account the fact that the minority 
interest holder lacks majority control.
17
  In valuing privately-held 
 
Pueblo Bancorporation v. Lindoe, 63 P.3d 353, 362 (Colo. 2003) (discussing that the fact 
that the legislature has required dissenters be paid both ―value‖ and ―fair value,‖ but never 
―fair market value‖); Cavalier Oil Corp., 564 A.2d 1137, 1144-45 (Del. 1989) (refusing to 
recognize the minority and marketability discounts in an action under Delaware‘s  appraisal 
statute); Security State Bank v. Ziegeldorf, 554 N.W. 2d  884, 889-90 (Iowa 1996) 
(eschewing minority and marketability discounts);  Arnaud v. Stockgrowers State Bank of 
Ashland Kansas, 992 P. 2d 216, 220-21 (Kan. 1999) (disregarding the marketability and 
minority discount); Fisher v. Fisher, 568 N.W. 2d 728, 731-32 (N.D. 1997) (refusing to 
apply minority discount in a divorce setting); Charland v. Country View Golf Club, Inc., 
588 A. 2d 609, 613 (R.I. 1991) (disallowing the minority and marketability discounts in a 
dissolution); First W. Bank Wall, 621 N.W. 2d at 617-18 (involving a valuation dispute in 
the context of the exercise of dissenters‘ rights); Hogle v. Zinetics Medi. Inc., 63 P. 3d 80, 
84 (Utah 2002) (discounts are inherently unfair to a minority shareholder who is not a 
willing seller); HMO-W Inc. v. SSM Health Care Sys., 611 N.W. 2d 250, 255 (Wis. 2000) 
(disallowing minority discount in an appraisal).  But see Blake v. Blake, 486 N.Y.S. 2d 341, 
349-50 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (concluding that ―fair value‖ encompasses a discount for the 
private nature of the company—the ―marketability discount,‖ but not a ―minority discount‖ 
reflecting the owner‘s lack of control in a company).  See also Munshower v. Kolbenheyer, 
732 So. 2d 385, 386-387 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (following New York‘s approach to 
defining ―fair value‖ to disregard the minority discount but to consider a marketability 
discount). 
 14. See SHANNON P. PRATT, ROBERT F. REILLY & ROBERT P. SCHWEIHS, VALUING A 
BUSINESS: THE ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF CLOSELY HELD COMPANIES, 323-24 (5th ed. 
2008) [hereinafter PRATT ET AL. 5th ed.]. 
 15. Id.  
 16. Id. at 322-23. 
 17. See Rebecca C. Cavendish & Christopher W. Kammerer, Determining the Fair 
Value of Minority Ownership Interests in Closely Held Corporations: Are Discounts for 
Lack of Control and Lack of Marketability Applicable? 82 FLA. B.J. 10, 11-12  (2008), 
available at 
http://www.floridabar.org/divcom/jn/jnjournal01.nsf/0/e6c13ab725ca5ed6852573db006eaab
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businesses, there may be considerable differences in the value of ownership 
interests that offer different degrees of control in the business.
18
  A number 
of elements impact the investor‘s nature and degree of control and may 
ultimately affect the value of the investor‘s interest.  These elements of 
control include the capacity to: 
1.  Appoint management. 
2.  Determine management compensation and perquisites. 
3.  Set policy and change the course of business. 
4.  Acquire or liquidate assets. 
5.  Select people with whom to do business and award 
contracts. 
6.  Make acquisitions. 
7.  Liquidate, dissolve, sell out, or recapitalize the company. 
8.  Sell or acquire treasury shares. 
9.  Register the company‘s stock for a public offering. 
10.  Declare and pay dividends. 
11.  Change the articles of incorporation. 
12.  Block any of the above actions.19 
Given the nature and scope of majority control, it is readily apparent 
that the owner of a controlling interest in an enterprise enjoys some very 
valuable rights that the minority owner does not possess.
20
  However, there 
is not a great deal of documentation regarding the existence and degree of 
minority discounts.  The rarity and possible difficulty of selling a minority 
interest on its own was documented in one study by a bank trust officer 
who administered trusts and estates that owned some or all of the interests 
in closely held businesses.
21
  The officer conducted two major studies of 
minority discounts.
22
  The first was comprised of data on 30 actual sales of 
minority interests.  The officer‘s data revealed that the average sale was 
36% below book value and only 20% of the sales were made at discounts 
less than 20%.  More than half of the sales were made at discounts ranging 
from 22% and 48%.
23
  Approximately 23 ½ percent of the sales were made 
at discounts from 54.4% to 78%.
24
  The second study also found substantial 
discounts.  It should be noted, however, that the discounts were from book 
value (rather than enterprise value), but discounts from enterprise value 
 
6?opendocument (discussing the challenges of valuing a business interest where majority 
control is lacking and reviewing Florida‘s unusual statutory approach of prohibiting 
discounts for closely held corporations that have 10 shareholders or less). 
 18. PRATT ET AL. 5th ed., supra note 14, at 323-24. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 321. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
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would have produced even greater discounts.
25
  Clearly, one or two studies 
are far from definitive.  What evidence does exist, however, leads one to 
believe that the minority discount is a very real market phenomenon. 
2.   The Marketability Discount 
The marketability discount takes into account the fact that there is not 
a ready market for a privately-held company.
26
  As a result, the owners of a 
private company that seek to sell the firm will face a number of costs not 
encountered by the public firm.
27
  One valuation expert has described these 
costs as follows: 
The controlling owner of a closely held company who wishes to 
liquidate a controlling equity interest generally faces the following 
transactional considerations: 
1.   Uncertain time horizon to complete offering or sale. 
2.   Cost to prepare for and execute offering or sale. 
3.   Risk as to eventual price. 
4.   Form of transaction proceeds. 
5.   Inability to hypothecate.28 
Given these transactional considerations, the value of a private 
company may be less than that of its publicly-traded counterpart since the 
illiquidity carries with it additional risks.
29
  However, as discussed below, 
the impact of the lack of marketability will be felt only if the company is 
sold.  Although a majority of courts now reject both the minority and 
marketability discounts, some courts in Florida
30
 and New York,
31
 have 
 
 25. Id. at 322. 
 26. Id. at 350-51. 
 27. See Mukesh Bajaj et al., Firm Value and Marketability Discounts, 27 J. CORP. L. 89, 
92-93 (2001) (discussing restrictions from selling an asset which causes the investor to 
forego the ability to sell at a maximum price). 
 28. PRATT ET AL. 5th ed., supra note 14, at 350-51. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Munshower v. Kolbenheyer, 732 So. 2d 385 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding 
the marketability discount but providing little analysis, and not containing a discussion of 
the minority discount).  It should be noted that this decision was reached prior to Florida‘s 
statutory changes prohibiting the minority and marketability discounts in corporations with 
ten or fewer shareholders.  See FLA. STAT. § 607.1430 (2010) (expressly disregarding 
minority and marketability discounts for corporations with ten or fewer shareholders but 
remaining silent with regard to larger corporations).  See also FLA. STAT. § 608.4351(5) 
(2010) (expressly disregarding minority or marketability discounts for LLCs with ten or 
fewer members). 
 31. See In re Murphy, 903 N.Y.S.2d 434, 437-38 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (applying a 
15% marketability discount in a corporate purchase in lieu of a dissolution); Blake v. Blake 
Agency, 486 N.Y.S.2d 341, 349 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (allowing a discount for lack of 
marketability where the marketability discount was applied to the goodwill of the company); 
MILLERFINALIZED_TWO (DO NOT DELETE) 4/28/2011  7:33 PM 
2011] DISCOUNTS AND BUYOUTS 615 
 
rejected the minority discount but permit the discount for the lack of 
marketability.  For example, some decisions in New York have rejected the 
minority discount but have applied the marketability discount.
32
  These 
New York decisions have reasoned that the marketability discount is 
appropriate to accurately reflect the lesser value of shares that cannot be 
freely traded like the shares of public companies.
33
  As one court recently 
 
In re Jamaica Acquisition, Inc., 901 N.Y.S.2d 907, at *17-18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009) (applying 
a marketability discount); Peter A. Mahler, Ruling on Valuation Discounts for 
Marketability, Built-In Gains Tax Ends Rift Among New York Appellate Courts, N.Y. 
BUSINESS DIVORCE (June 7, 2010), http://www.nybusinessdivorce.com/2010/06/articles/ 
valuation-discounts/ruling-on-valuation-discounts-for-marketability-builtin-gains-tax-ends-
rift-among-new-york-appellate-courts/  (discussing Matter of Murphy and observing that the 
Nassau County Commercial Division opinion had applied a 15% marketability discount to 
the value of the enterprise as a whole thereby rejecting precedents that had previously 
applied the marketability discount only to the goodwill of the company).  See also Mohlas 
Realty, LLC v. Koutelos, No. 5799/08, slip op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 7, 2009) (involving an 
answer asserting a 30% lack of marketability discount); In re Murphy, No. 002640/2006, 
slip op. at 23-28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 19, 2008) (indicating that the court is powerless to 
reject case law that has considered a lack of marketability discount).  In Hall v. King, 675 
N.Y.S.2d 810, 814-16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998), a N.Y. Supreme Court applied the 
marketability discount to the enterprise as a whole and not just to its goodwill.  The decision 
in Hall indicates that although there are some cases that have applied the marketability 
discount just to goodwill the better approach is to apply the marketability discount to the 
company as a whole, thus disagreeing with prior applications of the discount to goodwill 
only in Whalen v. Whalen’s Moving & Storage Co., 612 N.Y.S.2d 165, 166 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1996) and in Matter of Cinque v. Largo Enterprises, 212 A.D.2d 608, 610 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1995).  More recently, the Supreme Court of New York, Nassau County, observed that 
―upon a fair ready of Whalen and Cinique, the court is left without a reason for the rulings 
vis-à-vis goodwill v. other assets of an enterprise‖ and upheld the application of the 
marketability discount to the entire enterprise.  In re Jamaica Acquisition Inc., 901 N.Y.S.2d  
at *16-18. 
 32. See Raskin v. Karl, 514 N.Y.S.2d 120 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (applying the 
marketability discount in the context of a corporation dissolution case). 
 33. Blake v. Blake Agency, 107 A.D.2d 139, 149 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (applying a 
marketability discount).  But see Charland v. Country View Golf Club, 588 A.2d 609, 612-
13 (R.I. 1991) (refusing to apply minority discount or lack of marketability discount in an 
oppression suit).  In New Jersey, courts have sometimes rejected both the minority and 
marketability discount.  See Wheaton v. Smith, 734 A.2d 738, 750-51 (N.J. 1999) 
(observing that in appraisal actions the marketability discount should generally not apply 
and finding no extraordinary circumstances that would justify the discount where the 
dissenting shareholders had exercised their appraisal rights because they lacked confidence 
in new management).  See also Balsamides v. Protameen Chems. Inc., 734 A.2d 721 (N.J. 
1999) (recognizing the lack of marketability discount in extraordinary circumstances where 
there was a feud between two owners of a corporation and considerations of equity justified 
the marketability discount).  Though decided the same day as Wheaton, because of the 
unusual facts, the court ordered one fifty-percent owner to buy out the other owner, who had 
engaged in oppressive conduct.  Subsequently, a N.J. appellate court refused to find 
extraordinary circumstances justifying a marketability discount in connection with a divorce 
in the valuation of the husband‘s minority ownership of a family florist where there was no 
evidence of a possible sale of the business, presumably making market considerations 
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noted ―It is important to distinguish the minority discount and another 
commonly discussed discount, the marketability discount, which adjusts for 
a lack of liquidity.‖
34
  While denying a minority discount, an Oregon 
appellate court reasoned that the marketability discount properly captured 
the close corporation‘s volatility and illiquidity.
35
  In addition, some Florida 
court decisions have acknowledged that a discount for marketability may 
be appropriate in some cases.
36
 
3.   The Key Man Discount 
The Key Man Discount is a discount that adjusts the value of the 
business downward for the loss of human capital.
37
  For example, in the 
case of a firm whose goodwill is associated with one individual, the value 
 
relevant.  Brown v. Brown, 792 A.2d 463, 477-78 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002). 
 34. Brown v. Arp & Hammond Hardware, 141 P.3d 673, 679 (Wyo. 2006) (reversing 
the lower court‘s application of a minority discount). 
 35. See Columbia Mgmt. Co. v. Wyss, 765 P.2d 207, 213-14 (Or. Ct. App. 1988) 
(stating that a fair price for dissenting shareholder stock requires a market value 
assessment).  But see Chiles v. Robertson, 767 P.2d 903, 926-27 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) 
(refusing to apply a minority and marketability discount where there was misconduct by the 
defendant). 
 36. See Cox Enterprises v. News-Journal Corporation, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1108-09 
(M.D. Fla. 2006) (indicating that a discount for a lack of marketability is a qualifying 
component of computing ―fair value.‖); Hall v. King, 675 N.Y.S.2d 810, 814 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1998) (indicating that, under the present facts, there was insufficient support for the 
application of a discount).  See also Erp v. Erp, 976 So. 2d 1234, 1239-40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2008) (holding that the court has discretion to apply a marketability discount in an 
equitable distribution of marital assets in connection with a dissolution of marriage).  The 
Florida law regarding discounts has been in a state of flux, however, since the Florida 
corporate appraisal statute dealing with dissenters‘ rights and the LLC provision dealing 
with dissenters‘ rights were changed expressly to define ―fair value‖ to disregard the 
minority and marketability in corporations or LLCs with ten or fewer shareholders or LLC 
members.  See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.1301, 1302 (2010) (expressly disregarding minority 
and marketability discounts for corporations with ten or fewer shareholders but remaining 
silent with regard to larger corporations in connection with corporate shareholders‘ appraisal 
rights); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.4351, 4352 (2010) (expressly disregarding minority and 
marketability discounts for LLCs with ten or fewer members but remaining silent with 
regard to larger LLCs in connection with LLC members‘ appraisal rights).  Interestingly, 
Florida‘s corporate judicial dissolution statute offers a buyout in lieu of a judicial 
dissolution using the term ―fair value,‖ but it does not contain special provisions for small 
corporations or any other guidance on the term ―fair value.‖  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.1436 
(2010).  Florida‘s LLC dissolution provision does not offer a buyout in lieu of dissolution 
and thus offers no guidelines on valuation methodology that might apply in the specific 
context of a judicially ordered buyout.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.449 (2010).  See Cavendish & 
Kammerer, supra note 17. 
 37. The seminal revenue ruling on business valuation addresses the key man discount.  
See Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237 (indicating that the loss of a key person can have a 
depressing effect upon the value of a business). 
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of the business might go down significantly if the individual leaves the 
business.  The Key Man Discount may be appropriate in a minority buyout 
if the person seeking the buyout is also taking with her or him some 
customers or clients.
38
 
4.   The Pro Rata versus the Discount Approach 
Under a pro rata approach, the buy-out price is based on the LLC 
member‘s applicable ownership interest in the LLC.  Thus, in the simplest 
case, if an LLC member owning 75% of the LLC is ordered to buy out the 
interests of the 25% member, the purchase price will be based upon 25% of 
the value of the LLC in total.  No reduction would be made to reflect the 
fact that the 25% owner lacks control of the enterprise.  Thus, if the LLC is 
valued as a whole at $1,000,000, the buy-out price paid to the minority 
LLC member would be $250,000.  In contrast, an approach that recognizes 
a minority discount would reduce the $250,000 by an amount that would 
reflect the fact that a 25% owner lacks control of the LLC.  The pro rata 
approach assumes that all interests in the LLC are equal.  Thus, it does not 
take into account any contractual differences that may make some LLC 
interests more or less valuable than others. 
B.   The Unique Features of the LLC 
The LLC offers unprecedented flexibility combined with favorable 
flow-through taxation.  The flexibility that has made the LLC so popular 
has opened the door to richly varied LLC contractual relationships.  LLC 
members may have an interest in profits that differs from their interest in 
the capital of the entity.  Unlike S Corporation shareholders, each LLC 
member may have a unique constellation of ownership interests.  S 
Corporation shareholders are required to have only a single class of stock 
 
 38. See Bernier v. Bernier, 873 N.E.2d 216, 231-33 (Mass. 2007) (denying a key man 
discount under the present facts, but recognizing that a key man discount may be 
appropriate where [a] an individual‘s continuing services are critical to the financial success 
of the company, and [b] where the services would be lost).  See also Hodas v. Spectrum 
Tech., Inc., Civil Action No. 11,265, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 252, *13-15 (Del. Ch. Dec. 7, 
1992) (disallowing a marketability discount but allowing a key man discount where a 
shareholder had personal contacts and a unique combination of skills and education).  But 
see Brown v. Allied Corrugated Box Co., Inc., 91 Cal. App. 3d 477, 488-89 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1979) (indicating that the goodwill that a controlling shareholder builds for the 
corporation should stay with the corporation and that a devaluation because the controlling 
shareholder could depart should not be considered).  See generally William P. Dukes, 
Business Valuation Basics for Attorneys, 1 J. BUS. VALUATION & ECON. LOSS ANALYSIS 
(2006), available at http://www.bepress.com/jbvela/vol1/iss1/art7/ (discussing important 
business valuation issues for attorneys including premiums, discounts, required return, and 
capitalization rates). 
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in order to qualify for favorable flow-through taxation.
39
  However, LLC 
members are taxed as partnerships and, under the partnership tax rules, 
LLC members may have widely divergent compensation arrangements and 
varying interests in profits.
40
  Additionally, not all those with financial 
rights in the LLC will be actual members of the LLC with members‘ rights.  
For example, one who has acquired an interest in an LLC by inheritance 
may be considered a transferee and not a member.
41
  The significance is 
that a transferee normally does not have voting or other rights enjoyed by 
LLC members; instead, the transferee merely has financial rights in the 
LLC.
42
 
Once the valuation expert, using one of several acceptable approaches 
to valuing the entity, determines the value of the LLC as a whole, the 
expert will then consider special adjustments such as contractual features or 
other factors that might impact the value of the ownership rights being 
transferred.  The question of whether a minority and/or marketability 
discount should be applied will arise where the member owns less than a 
controlling interest in a privately-owned LLC.  In answering these 
questions, it is important to analyze each discount individually and to 
carefully consider the statutory and factual context in which the valuation 
question arises. 
III.  THE LLC STATUTORY ENVIRONMENT 
A. The LLC Statutes 
The LLC statutes vary somewhat in their approaches to the judicial 
dissolution remedy, but virtually all states have some statutory reference to 
judicial dissolutions.
43
  Approximately twenty-five states provide for a 
judicial dissolution in the event of deadlock, oppressive behavior, or other 
stated misconduct.
44
  Approximately forty-four states, including some that 
also have remedies for oppressive conduct, provide for judicial dissolution 
 
 39. I.R.C. § 1361 (2006). 
 40. See I.R.C. § 704(c) (2006) (providing for various allocations of losses subject to the 
restriction that the allocations have a substantial economic effect). 
 41. See CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: 
TAX AND BUSINESS LAW § 8.06[2][a][i] (2010), available at Westlaw Limited Liab. Co. ¶ 
8.06 (explaining that transferees typically have no right to participate in management of an 
LLC). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See infra Appendices B, C, and E.  But see WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-25-108 (2010) 
(providing for an election for closely-held LLCs under which dissolution occurs only when 
[a] the period fixed for the duration of the company expires, [b] by unanimous written 
agreement of members, or [c] upon the occurrence of an event specified in the operating 
agreement; thus offering no statutory authorization for judicial dissolution). 
 44. See infra Appendix B. 
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on the grounds that it is not reasonably practicable to carry on business.
45
 
Unlike many corporate statutes providing for judicial dissolution in 
the event of deadlock, oppressive conduct, or other misconduct, most LLC 
statutes do not provide for a purchase in lieu of a judicial dissolution.  Most 
of the LLC statutes authorize judicial dissolution for illegal, fraudulent, or 
oppressive conduct, but they are silent with regard to the specific remedy of 
a buy-out or its valuation methodology.
46
  Approximately forty-one LLC 
statutes contain no express guidelines as to valuation in the event a judicial 
dissolution is avoided by a court-ordered buy-out.
47
 
The Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act authorizes 
judicial dissolution for illegal, fraudulent, or oppressive conduct, but fails 
to offer provisions for a buy-out in lieu of a dissolution or any related 
valuation guidelines.
48
  In contrast, approximately twenty-two corporate 
statutes provide for a purchase in lieu of a judicial dissolution pursuant to 
the Model Business Corporation Act, most of which use the term ―fair 
value‖ rather than ―fair market value‖ in designating how the buy-out 
should proceed.
49
 
The Delaware LLC statute authorizes judicial dissolution on the 
grounds that it is not reasonably practicable to carry on business.
50
  A few 
states do have LLC statutes that authorize a buy-out in lieu of dissolution.  
For instance, California and Utah authorize a buy-out in lieu of dissolution 
and specify that the valuation should be with reference to ―fair market 
value.‖
51
  Under the California statute, if the parties cannot agree on the fair 
market value, the court is required to appoint three appraisers who will 
determine the valuation.  The California and Utah statutes make no 
 
 45. See infra Appendix C. 
 46. See infra Appendices B and C. 
 47. See infra Appendix E. 
 48. REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 701, available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ullca/2006act_final.htm.  As of Aug. 2010, this 
has been enacted by Iowa, Nebraska, and Wyoming. 
 49. See infra Appendix E.  See also infra Appendix D (containing the Model Business 
Corporation‘s judicial dissolution provisions, which provide for a buy-out in lieu of a 
judicial dissolution triggered in part by oppressive conduct). 
 50. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-802 (2005).  See Polak v. Kobayashi, No. Civ.A. 05-
330 JJF, 2005 WL 2008306 (D. Del. Aug. 22, 2005) (concluding that there was no 
reasonably practicable way for the business to carry on where two attorneys had invested in 
real estate and one had refused to communicate with the other and transfer title to real estate 
from his own account to that of the LLC).  See also In re Arrow Investment Advisors, LLC, 
C.A. No. 4091-VCS, 2009 WL 1101682 (Del. Ch. Apr. 23, 2009) (refusing to grant 
dissolution and expressing concern that the petitioner was planning to side-step fiduciary 
duty claims and an arbitration agreement); In re Seneca Investments LLC, 970 A.2d 259, 
263 (Del. Ch. 2008) (involving suit for dissolution where one of three directors was 
removed). 
 51. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17351(b)(1)–(b) (3)  (West 2006).  See infra Appendix E. 
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references to valuation methodologies specified in the articles of 
organization.  Also, the Utah statute does not offer any direction in terms of 
the appointment of appraisers, but rather it authorizes the court to consider 
whatever factors it deems appropriate.
52
 
The Illinois LLC statute contains a buy-out provision in lieu of 
dissolution and specifies that the valuation is to be based on ―fair value.‖
53
  
In determining ―fair value,‖ the statute does not specify whether discounts 
are to be considered, but it does require the court to consider relevant 
evidence of going concern value, including agreements between the parties 
that specify a formula, for valuing the interests.  Pennsylvania provides for 
a distribution based upon ―fair value‖ when a member disassociates from 
the LLC; it also has a judicial dissolution provision that is tied to the ―not 
reasonably practicable standard.‖
54
  Under Pennsylvania‘s LLC dissolution 
provision, dissolution is triggered when it is no longer reasonably 
practicable to carry on the business.
55
  However, specific guidance on 
valuation in connection with judicial dissolution is not provided. 
In addition, Minnesota and North Dakota provide for dissolution of 
the LLC in lieu of a purchase.
56
  Minnesota‘s and North Dakota‘s buy-out 
provisions are at ―fair value‖ and direct the court to use the value indicated 
in the articles of organization unless the agreement is unreasonable under 
the circumstances.
57
 
In Tennessee, when the existence and the business of the LLC 
continue but a member‘s interest has been terminated for certain specified 
reasons (including when it is no longer practicable to do business with the 
member) the member is entitled to receive the fair value of the terminated 
membership interest.
58
  If the parties cannot agree upon fair value, the court 
is authorized to determine fair value.
59
  The statute directs the court to 
enforce governing terms in LLC documents that address fair value if the 
value is to be determined by the LLC operating agreement.
60
  In addition, 
the statute authorizes the imposition of attorney‘s fees, appraiser‘s fees, or 
 
 52. UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1214(4) (LexisNexis 2007).    
 53. See infra Appendix E.  See also 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/35-60, 180/35-65 
(West 2004). 
 54. See PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8933 (LexisNexis 2007) (addressing distributions upon 
dissociation); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8972 (LexisNexis 2010) (providing for dissolution 
when it is no longer practicable to carry on business). 
 55. Id. 
 56. See id. at app. E. 
 57. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.833 (West 2010).  See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-
32-119 (2008). 
 58. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-249-505(c) (2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-249-506 
(2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-249-617 (2008). 
 59. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-249-506 (2010). 
 60. See id. 
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other expenses of an expert if the party has not acted in good faith and has 
not engaged in fair dealing.
61
 
A minority of LLC statutes provide for dissenters‘ rights.
62
  For 
example, Florida‘s LLC statute provides for an appraisal in the event of 
certain mergers or conversions subject to modification, restriction, or 
elimination by contract.
63
  The Florida LLC appraisal rights direct that the 
minority and marketability discounts should be disregarded for LLCs with 
ten or fewer members.
64
  No statutory guidance for buy-outs in connection 
with appraisal rights is provided for the valuation of Florida LLCs with 
more than ten members.
65
 
As can be seen from the above summary and from Appendix E, most 
LLC statutes do not contain clear statutory definitions and guidelines as to 
the valuation of an LLC interest.  As for the case law, although LLC 
valuation case law is beginning to emerge, the majority of guidance must 
be gleaned from judicial precedents in the corporate and partnership arenas. 
IV.  THE DISCOUNTS AND THE CASE LAW 
Given the recent arrival of LLCs on the business entity landscape, it is 
not surprising that most of the established case law on minority and 
marketability discounts stems from the partnership and corporate settings.  
In analyzing this authority, it is important to carefully consider the specific 
statutory and factual contexts of the cases.  Also, although some courts talk 
about these discounts interchangeably, they are very different in nature. 
A.  The Minority Discount and the Corporate and Partnership Contexts 
Much of the judicial guidance on the minority and marketability 
discounts has been decided in connection with dissenters‘ statutes.  At 
present, virtually all states have corporate dissenters‘ rights statutes, also 
 
 61. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-249-506(3)(B)(v) (2010). 
 62. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 17604 (Deering 2010) (providing for dissenters‘ rights with 
fair market value payment); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.4352 (LexisNexis 2010) (providing for 
appraisal rights subject to limitations); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-603(a) (2010); MINN. STAT. 
§ 322B.386 (LexisNexis 2007) (using the term fair value); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-54 
(2010) (using the term fair value); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1705.40-41 (LexisNexis 2010) 
(using term fair cash value); WASH. REV. CODE § 25.15.430 (2010). 
 63. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.4352 (LexisNexis 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.4352(4) 
(LexisNexis 2010). 
 64. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.4351 (LexisNexis 2010). 
 65. Interestingly, the Florida LLC provision addressing judicial dissolutions contains no 
express guidelines for valuations in a court-ordered buy-out in lieu of a judicial dissolution. 
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.449 (LexisNexis 2010).  In contrast, the Florida corporate 
judicial dissolution provisions provide for a ―fair value‖ buy-out in lieu of a judicial 
dissolution.  FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 607.1430, 1434, 1436 (LexisNexis 2010). 
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known as the appraisal remedy.
66
  Dissenters‘ rights give the minority 
interest holder in a company the right to disapprove the proposed 
fundamental change in the corporation such as where a major acquisition 
results in a reorganization of the company that may be accompanied by a 
change in management.
67
 The shareholders who dissent from the 
transaction are entitled to receive the ―fair value‖ of their shares.
68
  
Shareholders of private corporations as well as public companies may 
utilize dissenters‘ rights and as indicated previously, a small number of 
LLC statutes have enacted dissenters‘ rights.
69
  There can be some overlap 
in situations giving rise to dissenters‘ rights and those justifying petitions 
for a judicial dissolution—an attempted squeeze-out of a minority owner 
may give rise to either action.
70
  However, the petition for judicial 
dissolution typically occurs in the privately-owned corporation and may 
encompass deadlocks among shareholders.
71
  Dissenters‘ rights may be 
triggered by any number of disagreements with fundamental changes in the 
enterprise and can occur in the context of public or private companies.
72
 
The seminal case on minority discounts in the context of dissenters‘ 
rights is Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett
73
 in which the Delaware Supreme 
Court rejected the application of a minority discount in connection with 
Delaware‘s appraisal remedy.
74
  The Delaware appraisal statute does not 
expressly eschew the minority discount, but the Delaware Supreme Court 
 
 66. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE at Pt. VII, ch. 4, 
291-92, 296 (2007) (indicating that an ABA survey found that all jurisdictions have a statute 
specifying events giving rise to appraisal rights).  These statutes typically offer cash equal to 
the ―fair value‖ of the minority‘s shares when there has been a major event has occurred 
such as a merger, consolidation, mandatory sale of substantially all assets, etc.  The statutes 
emerged at about the time when American corporate law dropped the requirement that 
unanimous shareholder approval was needed for mergers and other fundamental changes. 
 67. See id. at 7.21 cmt. c (elaborating upon five different triggering events including: 1) 
business combinations; 2) squeeze-out transactions; 3) sale of substantial assets; 4) charter 
amendments; and 5) events designated in corporate charter documents other than bylaws). 
 68. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2010) (providing for the determination of ―fair 
value‖ for purposes of an appraisal proceeding).  See also id. at app. E (listing of statutes 
authorizing judicial dissolution and/or buyouts). 
 69. See; CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 17604 (Deering 2007) (providing for dissenters‘ 
rights with fair market value payment); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-603(a) (2007); MINN. STAT. 
§ 322B.386 (West 2007) (using the term fair value); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-54 (2008) 
(using the term fair value); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1705.40 & 1705.41 (LexisNexis 2008) 
(using term fair cash value); WASH. REV. CODE § 25.15.430 (2010). 
 70. SANDRA K. MILLER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, § 7:1 (2009) (providing an 
overview of unfairly prejudicial or oppressive conduct). 
 71. Id. 
 72. See generally F. HODGE O‘NEAL & ROBERT THOMPSON, O‘NEAL & THOMPSON‘S 
OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC MEMBERS, (2d ed. 2010) (providing an 
overview of legal issues affecting minority investors in private companies). 
 73. 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989). 
 74. Id. at 1142. 
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exposed the problems posed by the minority discount and began a national 
trend away from minority discounts in the corporate contexts.
75
 
In Cavalier Oil, the plaintiff, a minority shareholder, sought the ―fair 
value‖ of his stock pursuant to Delaware‘s appraisal statute.  As explained 
by the court, the appraisal statute requires the shareholder who dissents 
from a cash-out merger to receive the ―fair value‖ or intrinsic value of his 
or her shares.
76
  The task of the court, in the words of Justice Walsh, is to 
―value what has been taken from the shareholder:  ‗viz his proportionate 
interest in a going concern.‘‖
77
  The court concluded that the application of 
a minority discount was contrary to the requirement that the company be 
regarded as a going concern.
78
  Further, the court emphasized that the 
appraisal process is not designed to reconstruct a pro forma sale.
79
  Thus, 
the compensation to the dissenting investor is compensation for the 
deprivation of an investment that the shareholder would have been willing 
to maintain had the merger not occurred.
80
 
The court articulated several major policy reasons for rejecting the 
minority discount.  First, it emphasized that discounting injects an 
undesirable degree of speculation into the valuation process.
81
  Second, it 
argued that discounting ends up penalizing the minority investor for his or 
her lack of control.
82
  Third, the court pointed out that the minority discount 
unfairly enriches the majority shareholders who may get a windfall by 
cashing out the dissenting shareholder.
83
 
Subsequent to Cavalier Oil, a majority of courts rejected the minority 
discount in the context of dissenters‘ cases.
84
  The deterrence function of 
 
 75. See DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262 (2010). 
 76. Cavalier Oil Corp., 564 A.2d at 1137. 
 77. Id. at 1144-45. 
 78. Id. 1145-46. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 1145. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Foy v. Klapmeier, 992 F.2d 774, 781 (8th Cir. 1993); Pro Finish USA, Ltd v. 
Johnson, 63 P.3d 288, 294 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); Brown v. Allied Corrugated Box. Co. Inc., 
91 Cal. App.3d 477, 486-87 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Security State Bank v. Ziegeldorf, 
554 N.W.2d 884, 889-90 (Iowa 1996); Arnaud v. Stockgrowers State Bank, 992 P.2d 216, 
220 (Kan. 1999); Hansen v. 75 Ranch Co. 957 P.2d 32, 42 (Mont. 1998);  Rigel Corp. v. 
Cutchall, 511 N.W.2d 519, 526 (Neb. 1989); Lawson Mardon Inc. v. Smith, 734 A.2d 738, 
748 (N.J. 1999); Friedman v. Beway Realty Corp., 661 N.E.2d 972, 975 (N.Y. 1995); Woolf 
v. Universal Fid. Life Ins. Co., 849 P.2d 1093, 1095 (Okla. Civ. App. 1992); Charland v. 
Country View Golf Club Inc., 588 A.2d 609, 613 (R.I. 1991); Stone v. People‘s Trust & 
Sav. Bank, 363 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1039 (S.D. Ind. 2005); Robblee v. Robblee, 841 P.2d 
1289, 1295 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992); Columbia Mgmt. Co. v. Wyss, 765 P.2d 207, 214; 
HMO-W Inc. v. SSM Health Care Sys., 611 N.W.2d 250, 255 (Wis. 2000); Brown v. Arp, 
141 P.3d 673, 683 (Wyo. 2006). 
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dissenters‘ statutes has been cited as a compelling reason to deny the 
minority discount in the dissenters context.
85
  In Pueblo Bancorporation v. 
Lindoe, Inc.,
86
 the Colorado Supreme Court rejected both the minority and 
marketability discount in connection with the interpretation of a pre-1999 
formulation of the Model Business Corporation Act that did not yet 
expressly prohibit such discounts.
87
  Subsequently in 1999, the Model 
Business Corporation Act was amended to expressly eschew the minority 
and marketability discounts for purposes of the definition of ―fair value.‖
88
  
The ALI Principles of Corporate Governance similarly reject the minority 
discount, but leave open the application of the marketability discount in 
extraordinary circumstances as discussed below.
89
 
The argument against minority discounts originating in dissenters‘ 
rights cases has been extended to the broader context of close corporation 
oppression cases.  In Elder v. Elder,
90
 for instance, two brothers owned a 
closely held company in which the plaintiff owned 40% and his brother 
owned the remaining 60% of the corporation.  The defendant had taken 
away the plaintiff‘s salary and check-writing privileges and terminated his 
role as vice president.  The appellate court noted that the lower court had 
embraced precedents emphasizing that: 
A minority discount frustrates the equitable purpose of protecting 
a minority shareholder from a squeeze-out . . . remedying 
shareholder oppression has the same objective of protecting a 
minority shareholder.  The exclusion of Richard [the minority 
shareholder] created the same situation faced by a dissenter 
shareholder in a closely held corporation:  ―The shareholder not 
only lacks control over corporate decision making, but also upon 
the application of a minority discount receives less than 
proportional value for loss of that control.‖  Equity is served by 
allowing the ―squeezed‖ shareholder his or her proportionate 
interest of the corporation as a going concern.
91
 
The trend away from the minority discount may also be seen in the 
partnership arena.  Section 701 of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act 
 
 85. Brown v. Arp, 141 P.3d at 687. 
 86. 63 P.3d 353 (Colo. 2003). 
 87. Id. at 368-69. 
 88. See 3 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.34 (1998) (authorizing a buy-out in lieu of a 
judicial dissolution); Id. at §§ 13.01(4), 13-3 (1998) (providing guidelines for determining 
fair value defined as ―. . . the value of the corporation‘s shares . . . using customary and 
current valuation concepts . . . without discounting for lack of marketability or minority 
status‖). 
 89. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 7.22 (2007). 
 90. Elder v. Elder, No. 2006AP2937, 2007 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1130 (Wis. App. Dec. 
27, 2007). 
 91. Id. at *12-14 (internal citations omitted). 
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provides that a disassociated partner has the right to obtain a ―buyout‖ of 
his interest at the greater of the liquidation value or the amount 
distributable to the dissociating partner if the entire business had been sold 
as a going concern without the dissociating partner.
92
  In addition, interest 
is payable from the date of the dissociation.  The comments to RUPA 
indicate that the buyout price envisioned in RUPA is formulated to reject 
the minority discount but may encompass the application of a marketability 
discount or other relevant discounts.
93
  The comments indicate that other 
discounts may be fair and appropriate to reflect the private nature of the 
firm or to factor in a discount for the loss of a key partner.
94
 
 
 92. See REVISED UNIF. P‘SHIP ACT § 701 (1997), available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/uparta/1997act_final.htm. 
(a) If a partner is dissociated from a partnership without resulting in a 
dissolution and winding up of the partnership business under Section 801, the 
partnership shall cause the dissociated partner‘s interest in the partnership to be 
purchased for a buyout price determined pursuant to subsection (b). 
 (b) The buyout price of a dissociated partner‘s interest is the amount that would 
have been distributable to the dissociating partner under Section 807(b) if, on 
the date of dissociation, the assets of the partnership were sold at a price equal 
to the greater of the liquidation value or the value based on a sale of the entire 
business as a going concern without the dissociated partner and the partnership 
were wound up as of that date. Interest must be paid from the date of 
dissociation to the date of payment. 
 93. Id. § 701 cmt. 3 (emphasis added) provides: 
The terms ―fair market value‖ or ―fair value‖ were not used because they are 
often considered terms of art having a special meaning depending on the 
context, such as in tax or corporate law.  ―Buyout price‖ is a new term.  It is 
intended that the term be developed as an independent concept appropriate to 
the partnership buyout situation, while drawing on valuation principles 
developed elsewhere.  
Under subsection (b), the buyout price is the amount that would have been 
distributable to the dissociating partner under Section 807(b) if, on the date of 
dissociation, the assets of the partnership were sold at a price equal to the 
greater of liquidation value or going concern value without the departing 
partner.  Liquidation value is not intended to mean distress sale value.  Under 
general principles of valuation, the hypothetical selling price in either case 
should be the price that a willing and informed buyer would pay a willing and 
informed seller, with neither being under any compulsion to deal.  The notion of 
a minority discount in determining the buyout price is negated by valuing the 
business as a going concern.  Other discounts, such as for a lack of 
marketability or the loss of a key partner, may be appropriate, however. 
 94. See Warnick v. Warnick, 133 P.3d 997, 1004 (2006) (failing to discuss the 
marketability discount, but holding that, pursuant to Wyoming‘s partnership statute that 
included willing buyer/willing seller language, there should be no reduction for hypothetical 
costs of selling the business where the business is continued after the buyout of the 
dissociating partner).  See generally Donald J. Weidner and John W. Larson, The Revised 
Uniform Partnership Act: The Reporters’ Overview, 49 BUS. LAW. 1, 11 (1993) (indicating 
that the buy-out to the dissociating partner should  be based on the higher of the liquidation 
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The similarity between cases involving dissenting shareholders and 
cases involving withdrawing partners was observed by the Maryland 
Circuit Court, which concluded that both the minority and marketability 
discounts should be disregarded in the case of the withdrawing partner as 
the dissenting shareholder.
95
  In Larkin v. Ratta,
96
 the court noted: 
The logic of the authorities that reject both minority and 
marketability discounts in the dissenting shareholder context is 
equally applicable to a valuation analysis under § 10-604.  This is 
not a marketplace transaction involving a third party purchaser.  
Instead it is a statutory redemption intended to make the 
withdrawing partners whole by allowing them to ―cash out‖ their 
interests.
97
 
In summary, there is growing support for disregarding the minority 
discount in dissenters‘ rights cases, in close corporation oppression cases,
98
 
and under statutory formulations contained in the Model Business 
Corporation Act.
99
  As more fully discussed below, while the American 
Law Institute‘s Principles of Corporate Governance and the Revised 
Uniform Partnership Act reject the minority discount, they take a slightly 
more permissive stance vis-à-vis the marketability discount.
100
 
B.  The Marketability Discount in the Corporate and Partnership Setting 
As discussed in Part II above, the marketability discount is designed to 
adjust the value of the enterprise to take into account the fact that it is a 
private entity without a ready market and it may take time to sell the 
enterprise.  This delay, or illiquidity, presents unknown risks concerning 
possible changes in technology, competition, or markets.  The discount 
adjusts for the lack of liquidity because there are presumably a limited 
number of buyers for a privately-held enterprise.
101
 
 
value or the going concern value, and that the dissociating partner should not be paid for his 
human capital that goes with him). 
 95. Larkin v. Della Ratta, No. C-2002-80490.BC, 2005 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 18, at *33 
(Md. Cir. Ct. March 24, 2005). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See Baur v. Baur Farms, Inc., No. 9-9-31/09-0480, 2010 Iowa App. LEXIS 117, at 
*20-21 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2010) (observing that the legislature has prohibited the 
marketability and minority discounts). 
 99. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.34 (authorizing a buy-out in lieu of a judicial 
dissolution); § 13.01(4) at 13-3 (1998) (providing guidelines for determining fair value 
defined as ―the value of the corporation‘s shares . . . using customary and current valuation 
concepts . . . without discounting for lack of marketability or minority status . . . .‖). 
 100. See infra Part II.B. 
 101. See Larkin v. Della Ratta, No. C-2002-80480.BC, 2005 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 18, 
*29-30 (Md. Cir. Ct. March 24, 2005) (―A marketability discount adjusts for the lack of 
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Many of the arguments that have been levied against the minority 
discount in the context of dissenting shareholder cases can be advanced 
against the marketability discount as well.
102
  Like the minority discount, 
the marketability discount adjusts to market conditions, whereas the goal of 
both dissenters‘ rights statutes and oppression remedies is to compensate 
the investor for the loss of the investment opportunity.  From a policy 
standpoint, the application of a marketability discount similarly introduces 
uncertainty in the valuation process and runs the risk of rewarding the 
majority misconduct.
103
 
Even in the absence of express statutory condemnation, Cavalier Oil 
set the stage for rejecting the idea of discounting generally by emphasizing 
that the point of an appraisal was not to simulate a pro forma sale.
104
  Then, 
in 1999, the Model Business Corporation Act was amended to expressly 
prohibit both minority and marketability discounts in its definition of ―fair 
value‖ governing buy-outs pursuant to dissenters‘ statutes and buy-outs in 
lieu of judicial dissolution triggered by illegal, oppressive or fraudulent 
majority conduct.
105
 
The American Law Institute takes a slightly more permissive approach 
to the marketability discount than to the minority discount.
106
  While 
prohibiting the minority discount under its definition of fair value for buy-
outs in appraisal actions, the ALI leaves the door slightly ajar with regard 
to the marketability discount.
107
  In defining fair value, the ALI provides 
that ―the fair value of shares under § 7.21 (Corporate Transactions Giving 
Rise to Appraisal Rights) should be the value of the eligible holder‘s [§ 
1.17] proportionate interest in the corporation, without any discount for 
 
liquidity based on the notion that there are limited potential buyers for shares in a small 
organization.‖). 
 102. See East Park Ltd. P‘ship v. Larkin, 893 A.2d 1219, 1231-33 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2006) (discussing the arguments against the marketability discount); Drury Indus., Inc. v. 
Drury Props., Inc., No. 03-00852A, 2005 WL 5072229, nn.10-12 (Nev. Dist. Ct. March 23, 
2005) (involving a cash-out merger). 
 103. East Park, 893 A.2d at 1232. 
 104. Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1145-46 (Del. 1989).  The Delaware 
corporate statute contains no definition of ―fair value‖ and no express direction regarding 
the minority or marketability discounts.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2010) (showing 
the lack of statutory condemnation of discounting under relevant Delaware appraisal law). 
 105. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.34 (authorizing a buy-out in lieu of a judicial 
dissolution); § 13.01(4) at 13-3 (1998) (providing guidelines for determining fair value 
defined as ―the value of the corporation‘s shares . . . using customary and current valuation 
concepts . . . without discounting for lack of marketability or minority status . . . .‖).  See 
also Brown v. Arp and Hammond Hardware Co., 141 P.3d 673, 684 (Wyo. 2006) 
(discussing thoroughly the Model Business Corporation Act‘s provisions pertaining to 
discounts in a dissenters‘ rights buy-out case). 
 106. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 7.22, at 
314-15. 
 107. See id. 
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minority status or, absent extraordinary circumstances, lack of 
marketability.‖
108
  The ALI does not itself provide a statutory provision for 
judicial buy-outs in the event of oppressive conduct.  Nevertheless, the ALI 
does contain some commentary on oppressive conduct suits and suggests 
that courts might properly look to the ALI‘s guidelines for determining fair 
value under dissenters‘ provisions in implementing buy-outs occurring in 
the context of oppressive conduct statutes.
109
 
The Revised Uniform Partnership Act also leaves the door slightly 
ajar with respect to discounts other than the minority discount, providing 
that other discounts ―such as for a lack of marketability or the loss of a key 
partner, may be appropriate . . . .‖
110
  As noted previously, the Revised 
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act authorizes a judicial dissolution, 
but is silent with regard to the possibility of a court-ordered purchase in 
lieu of a dissolution and thus, contains no guidance on valuation matters.
111
 
Thus, while there seems to be a strong consensus against the minority 
discount among the Model Business Corporation Code, the ALI, and the 
RUPA, there are subtle differences regarding the marketability discount, 
with the Model Business Corporation Code rejecting the marketability 
discount outright, and the ALI and the RUPA generally rejecting the 
marketability discount, but possibly countenancing rare exceptions (albeit 
extraordinary exceptions, in the case of the ALI).
112
 
C.   Emerging LLC Case Law 
There is comparatively little LLC case law that addresses the 
valuation of LLC interests in connection with oppressive conduct.  In 
 
 108. See id. (providing that: 
The fair value of shares under 7.21 (Corporate Transactions Giving Rise to 
Appraisal Rights) should be the value of the eligible holder‘s [1.17] 
proportionate interest in the corporation, without any discount for minority 
status or, absent extraordinary circumstances, lack of marketability.  Subject to 
Subsections (b) and (c), fair value should be determined using the customary 
valuation concepts and techniques  generally employed in the relevant securities 
and financial markets for similar businesses in the context of the transaction 
giving rise to appraisal. 
). 
 109. Id. § 7.21 cmt. h, at 312. 
 110. REVISED UNIF. P‘SHIP ACT § 701 cmt. 3 (1997), available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/uparta/1997act_final.htm. 
 111. Id. 
 112. In 2003, the court indicated that of the jurisdictions with ―fair value‖ statutes, courts 
in fifteen states had held that a marketability discount should not be applied, and only six 
states had concluded that fair value may include marketability discounts (Florida, Illinois, 
Kentucky, Virginia interpreting Maryland law, New York, and Oregon). Pueblo 
Bancorporation v. Lindoe Inc., 63 P.3d 353, 366-68 (Colo. 2003). 
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Marsh v. Billington Farms, LLC,
113
  the Rhode Island Superior Court 
summarily concluded, based upon a Rhode Island corporate oppression 
case, that the minority and marketability discount should not apply.
114
  
Also, the court failed to explore whether there were precedents from Rhode 
Island partnership cases that might be relevant.  Interestingly, the court 
applied its corporate statute‘s dissolution provisions applicable even though 
the case under consideration involved an LLC.  Clearly, the corporate 
oppression statute was the inappropriate provision.  Rhode Island‘s LLC 
dissolution provision allows for judicial dissolution when it is no longer 
reasonably practicable to carry on the business.
115
  Apparently, the parties 
had disputed this point but had entered into a consent order agreeing to 
apply the corporate provision anyway.  In any event, the decision provides 
virtually no policy analysis regarding LLC valuation matters.  
Nevertheless, Marsh shows a judicial willingness to apply without question 
corporate precedents regarding the minority and marketability discounts to 
the LLC.
116
 
In Denike v. Cupo,
117
 a case involving a dispute between co-owners of 
an LLC, a New Jersey Superior court upheld a valuation of an LLC interest 
without regard to a marketability or minority discount, even though the 
New Jersey LLC statute provides that upon resignation of a member, the 
member is entitled to receive the ―fair value of his limited liability 
company interest . . . less all applicable valuation discounts, unless the 
operating agreement provides for another distribution formula.‖
118
  The 
appellate court observed that there is not an inflexible test for determining 
fair value, and refused to conclude that the valuation expert‘s opinion was 
contrary to accepted valuation methodology.  The opinion emphasized that 
the decision was not inconsistent with accepted valuation principles since 
accepted principles recognized that the minority and marketability 
discounts should not apply where an actual sale of an entire business 
appears unlikely.
119
  The court largely ignored the statute‘s reference to 
discounts in the wording of the LLC statute.  Had the court addressed this 
specific statutory language it might have concluded that no valuation 
discounts were applicable under the facts, especially given the nature of the 
business at issue. 
 
 113. 2007 R.I. Super. LEXIS 105 (R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 2007). 
 114. Id. at *12-13 (citing Charland v. Country View Golf Club, 588 A.2d 609, 613 (R.I. 
1991)). 
 115. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-40 (2010). 
 116. Marsh v. Billington Farms, LLC, C.A. No. PB 04-3123, 2007 R.I. Super. LEXIS 
105 (R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 2007). 
 117. Denike v. Cupo, 926 A.2d 869, 887 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010). 
 118. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-39 (West 2010); Denike, 926 A.2d at 884-85. 
 119. 926 A.2d at 884-85. 
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Another recent LLC valuation controversy arose in the context of a 
divorce.  In In re Thornhill,
120
 the Colorado Supreme Court was asked to 
determine the appropriateness of applying a marketability discount to 
determine the value of NGR Services, LLC, an LLC that was an oil and gas 
service company.
121
  The magistrate refused to extend the holding of 
Pueblo Bancorporation v. Liondoe, Inc., which prohibited a marketability 
discount in a dissenters‘ rights case to a divorce proceeding.  The trial court 
enforced a separation agreement that had used a 33% marketability 
discount in valuing an LLC interest.  The Appellate Court reversed, finding 
that the separation agreement was unconscionable, and also went on to 
reject the wife‘s argument that a per se rule disregarding the marketability 
discount should be applied in the divorce context.
122
  Although the 
Colorado Supreme Court determined that the Pueblo decision had 
interpreted the statutory language ―fair value‖ in the specific context of a 
dissenters‘ statute, the present case arose under a different statute and did 
not use the term ―fair value.‖
123
  Pueblo had reasoned that the legislature 
would have used the term ―fair market value‖ if it so intended, and that the 
term ―fair value‖ value did not encompass the marketability discount.
124
  
The minority discount was not at issue in the divorce case.
125
 
In In re Thornhill, the Colorado Supreme Court observed that while 
there was a national trend against the marketability discount in dissenters‘ 
cases, there was no similar national consensus prohibiting the marketability 
discount in a divorce setting.
126
  In fact, the Court observed that most courts 
had left the question of the marketability discount to the court‘s discretion 
when valuing the interest of a company in a divorce proceeding.
127
  The 
Court emphasized that in the context of divorce, a non-member spouse is 
not a victim of shareholder oppression, and stressed that the goal in the 
valuation is to reach an equitable division of marital property.
128
  Although 
In re Thornhill will obviously impact future divorce valuation cases, it 
leaves open the question of valuation of LLCs in other contexts not 
involving divorce.  Presumably, in the face of Pueblo, it will be difficult to 
support the application of either a minority or marketability discount in the 
context of a squeeze-out of a Colorado LLC member. 
Thus, at present, outside of the divorce context, the few LLC cases 
 
 120. 232 P.3d 782 (Colo. App. 2010). 
 121. Id. at 784-85. 
 122. Id. at 786. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Pueblo Bancorporation v. Lindoe, Inc., 63 P. 3d 353, 361 (Colo. 2003). 
 125. In re Thornhill, 232 P.3d at 782. 
 126. Id. at 786. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
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that have addressed valuation questions have not applied minority or 
marketability discounts.  The decision in Denike is somewhat helpful in its 
attempt to explain why the marketability discount was not applicable under 
the facts.
129
  According to the court, there would be no actual transfer of the 
company and a sale of the company appears unlikely.
130
  It appears that the 
court felt that because there was no real market for the LLC, adjustment of 
the LLC‘s value to reflect market conditions would be inappropriate.  As 
more fully discussed below, the improbability that a company will ever be 
sold presents a sound rationale for eschewing the marketability discount.  
However, the court‘s analysis of the marketability discount issue in Denike 
is somewhat incomplete.  The court fails to mention that the New Jersey 
Supreme Court has recognized that extraordinary circumstances may 
sometimes justify the marketability discount.
131
  Perhaps the court deemed 
that such circumstances could only arise where the LLC has the possibility 
of a credible market.  However, the decision would have been more helpful 
had it fully analyzed New Jersey corporate precedents. 
Given the paucity of direct guidance in the LLC setting, courts should 
look to the relevant jurisdiction‘s corporate and partnership precedents to 
determine whether a minority and/or marketability discount should be 
applied.  As more fully discussed below, the question of whether discounts 
should apply is context-specific.  Different policy considerations may be 
presented depending upon whether the valuation question arises in the 
setting of oppressive conduct, the exercise of dissenters‘ rights, a divorce 
settlement, or a tax controversy.  An appreciation of the policy issues raised 
in specific settings, and a keen sensitivity to the facts presented in the 
controversy, are indispensable. 
As discussed below, in the context of oppressive conduct, there are 
strong policy reasons favoring a per se prohibition of the minority discount.  
In addition, there are compelling arguments supporting a general rule 
prohibiting the marketability discount.  In tax contexts and/or in divorce 
settings, different policy and statutory terms may come into play.  Some 
courts have argued that in the divorce context, a different and more flexible 
approach to valuation may be appropriate.
132
  However, a number of the 
 
 129. Denike v. Cupo, 926 A.2d 869, 884-885 (N.J. App. 2010). 
 130. Id. at 382-383. 
 131. Id.  The decision cites Balsamides v. Protameen Chems. Inc., 734 A.2d 721 (N.J. 
1999), but does not explain why Balsamides presented extraordinary circumstances 
justifying a marketability discount.  The case, however, should be distinguished from the 
facts presented in Balsamide where the court held that it would be inequitable to require one 
fifty-percent owner to buy out another where the purchasing shareholder was apparently the 
victim of the other fifty-percent owner‘s difficult conduct.  Id. 
 132. See Sweet v. Sweet, No. 2007-A-0003 and 2008-A-0003, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 
1607 at *32, *45 (Ohio App. Apr. 27, 2009) (observing broad discretion to adopt a method 
for valuation in a divorce case and upholding discretion to employ marketability discounts). 
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arguments against the discounts appear relevant in both the oppression and 
divorce settings. 
V.   A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH TO THE LLC DISCOUNT DILEMMA 
An appreciation of the policy issues raised in each LLC valuation 
setting will be important to the development of a well-supported approach 
to the minority discount and the marketability discount in the LLC.  It is 
important for courts to be cognizant of the context of the valuation case and 
whether it arises in the setting of an oppression suit, an ordinary withdrawal 
from the LLC, a divorce, or under other circumstances. 
The context of the law is of growing importance in connection with 
contract interpretation as well as in other areas of jurisprudence, both 
within and outside of the United States.
133
  In writing about the benefits of a 
contextual approach to law, Professor Larry DiMatteo recently discussed 
―[t]he rule that Llewellyn targets for criticism is what he calls the rule-of-
thumb or paper rule.‖
134
  Professor DiMatteo describes this as a rule that is 
cut off from its underlying reasons.
135
  Under a contextual approach, the 
outcome of a legal result will be highly dependent upon the specific facts 
and circumstances, as well as the special interests, that are presented in a 
particular setting.
136
  In the case of the minority and/or a marketability 
discount, each specific setting, whether oppression or otherwise, raises its 
own policy considerations. 
A.   Policy Concerns Raised by the Minority Discount in the Oppression 
Setting and Beyond 
As can be gleaned from the above corporate and partnership contexts, 
there are compelling reasons to eschew the minority discount in LLC cases 
involving minority oppression.  These reasons apply with equal force in the 
setting of an LLC.  On balance, in minority LLC oppression cases, a per se 
rule makes sense.  First, the purpose of a judicial buy-out of an LLC 
 
 133. See generally Shalin M. Sugunasiri, Contextualism: The Supreme Court’s New 
Standard of Judicial Analysis and Accountability, 22 DALHOUSIE L. J. 126 (1999) 
(discussing contextualism in the Supreme Court of Canada). 
 134. See Larry A. DiMatteo, Reason and Context: A Dual Track Theory of 
Interpretation, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 397, 477-78 (2004) (observing broad discretion to 
adopt a method for valuation in a divorce case and upholding discretion to employ 
marketability discounts). 
 135. Id. 
 136. See id.  See generally Larry A. DiMatteo & Blake D. Morant, Contract in Context 
and Contract As Context, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 549 (2010); Sandra K. Miller, Legal 
Realism, the LLC, and a Balanced Approach to the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and 
Fair Dealing, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 729 (2010). 
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interest is not to closely simulate a market sale, but rather, to fashion a 
sensible remedy to compensate for a lost investment.  A judicially ordered 
buy-out occasioned by oppressive conduct is not voluntary in any sense of 
the word.
137
  As a forced sale that is the product of majority coercion, the 
judicial buy-out fails to involve a willing seller and willing buyer, the 
hallmark of which is a sale at ―fair market value.‖
138
  Further, from the 
standpoint of a majority LLC purchaser, a judicial buy-out by the majority 
of a minority LLC interest may not be the acquisition of a minority interest 
at all if the buyer already owns a majority of the LLC.
139
  As previously 
discussed in the corporate oppression case law, it could be argued that the 
application of a minority discount runs the risk of rewarding oppressive 
conduct by possibly permitting a buy-out of the minority‘s LLC interest at 
a bargain price.
140
  Application of the minority discount arguably penalizes 
the minority, unfairly enriches the majority, and undermines the deterrence 
function of oppression statutes.
141
  Further, the assumption of a hypothetical 
sale of the minority interest may be an entirely inappropriate premise where 
the minority interest has no value to others besides to the minority, where 
there is no market for the LLC, or where sales to outsiders would never be 
contemplated.
142
  Finally, the minority discount may introduce a troubling 
degree of uncertainty into the valuation process.
143
 
Are there any policy arguments in support of a minority LLC 
discount?  If one considers the perspective of the minority, the interest 
being sold is truly a minority interest even if it is being purchased by a 
majority owner.  In fact, the reason why the minority may have petitioned 
 
 137. See Robert C. Art, Shareholder Rights and Remedies in Close Corporations: 
Oppression, Fiduciary Duties, and Reasonable Expectations, 20 J. CORP. L. 371, 372 (2003) 
(emphasizing that the oppression remedy under Oregon law does not attempt to simulate a 
sale between a willing seller and a willing buyer). 
 138. See Treas. Reg. 20.2031-1(b) (2009) (indicating that fair market value is the price at 
which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither 
being under compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant 
facts). 
 139. See generally Moll, supra note 3, at 324. 
 140. See Harry Haynesworth IV, Valuation of Business Interests, 33 MERCER L. REV. 
457, 489 (1982) (observing that in cases involving squeeze-outs, discounts may undermine 
the purposes of dissenters or oppression statutes). 
 141. See Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989) (emphasizing 
speculative characteristics of the minority discount, the penalizing impact upon the 
minority, and the potential enrichment of the majority). See also Elder v. Elder, No. 
2006AP2937, 2007 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1130 (Wis. App. 2007); Brown v. Arp and 
Hammond Hardware Co., 141 P.3d 673 (Wyo. 2006) (emphasizing deterrence function of 
dissenters‘ statutes and rejecting the minority discount). 
 142. Id.  See also Denike v. Cupo, 926 A.2d 869, 884-85 (N.J. App. 2010). 
 143. Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1145 (Del. 1989) (stating that a 
minority discount may introduce a troubling degree of uncertainty into the valuation 
process). 
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the buy-out is likely to be because the controlling LLC member exercised 
majority powers to the minority‘s detriment.  Some may contend that a 
judicial buy-out at an undiscounted price gives the minority an incentive to 
threaten dissolution and could present a roadmap for opportunistic minority 
conduct.
144
  Finally, one might argue that under a number of LLC statutes, 
LLC judicial buy-outs are not triggered by ―oppressive conduct,‖ but rather 
occur when it is ―no longer reasonably practicable‖ to carry on the business 
of the LLC.  The ―no longer reasonably practicable‖ standard arguably 
does not present the protective minority purpose that is present where the 
applicable statute directs the judicial action when ―oppression‖ has taken 
place. 
Notwithstanding these counter arguments, on balance, a per se 
prohibition upon the minority discount still makes sense under both LLC 
statutes triggering the judicial action based upon ―oppression‖ as well as 
under LLC statutory provisions utilizing the ―not reasonably practicable to 
do business‖ formulation.  The arguments against the minority discount are 
more compelling than those in favor of it in the presence of ―oppression.‖  
The need to deter rather than facilitate exploitive majority conduct has been 
a cornerstone of the argument against the minority discount in corporate 
dissenters‘ and corporate squeeze-out settings.  Thus, in the setting of LLC 
buy-outs occasioned by assertions of majority oppression, the deterrence 
rationale largely supports a general rule prohibiting the minority discount. 
The Revised Uniform Partnership Act rejects the minority discount 
across the board with respect to partnership dissociations, including 
withdrawals—not just dissociations occasioned by misconduct.
145
  Some 
 
 144. See Hunt v. Data Management Resources, Inc., 985 P.2d 730, 732 (Kan. App. 1999) 
(involving a minority shareholder who sold the S Corporation stock to a corporation in an 
effort to disqualify the corporation from S Corporation status and thus coerce a buy-out at a 
given price). 
 145. See UNIF. P‘SHIP ACT § 801(5)(ii) (1997).  See also the REVISED UNIF. P‘SHIP ACT § 
701, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/uparta/1997act_final.htm. 
(a) If a partner is dissociated from a partnership without resulting in a 
dissolution and winding up of the partnership business under Section 801, the 
partnership shall cause the dissociated partner‘s interest in the partnership to be 
purchased for a buyout price determined pursuant to subsection (b). 
 (b) The buyout price of a dissociated partner‘s interest is the amount that would 
have been distributable to the dissociating partner under Section 807(b) if, on 
the date of dissociation, the assets of the partnership were sold at a price equal 
to the greater of the liquidation value or the value based on a sale of the entire 
business as a going concern without the dissociated partner and the partnership 
were wound up as of that date. Interest must be paid from the date of 
dissociation to the date of payment. 
Comment 3 provides: 
The terms ―fair market value‖ or ―fair value‖ were not used because they are 
often considered terms of art having a special meaning depending on the 
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may argue that the applicable LLC statute would have included similar 
language had the drafters of the LLC statute intended to similarly prohibit 
the minority discount.  However, others may argue that the absence of 
similar language is not dispositive and that given the similarity between 
partnerships and LLCs, statutory language designed to disregard minority 
discounts in partnership valuations lends weight to the argument against the 
minority discount in the LLC context. 
Another compelling argument supporting the disregard of the minority 
discount in the LLC is that, from the standpoint of the LLC, there is no 
acquisition of a minority interest when the minority withdraws from the 
LLC; rather, the LLC continues under ownership of the remaining 
members.
146
  Finally, a particularly persuasive argument is that the minority 
discount creates substantial uncertainty in the setting of the LLC.  This is 
especially evident when keeping in mind that the overall goal of LLC 
business entity governance is to allow business planners to achieve 
certainty and predictability in business affairs.  However, this uncertainty 
argument may be countered somewhat by emphasizing that an LLC 
member who could have achieved certainty via express contractual buy-out 
and valuation provisions but chose not to should not be allowed thereafter 
to complain about uncertain judicial valuation laws.  Nevertheless, 
regardless of whether an LLC member contractually self-protected, the 
goals of certainty and predictability in business entity governance are 
important considerations in selecting alternative business entities such as 
 
context, such as in tax or corporate law. ―Buyout price‖ is a new term. It is 
intended that the term be developed as an independent concept appropriate to 
the partnership buyout situation, while drawing on valuation principles 
developed elsewhere.  
Under subsection (b), the buyout price is the amount that would have been 
distributable to the dissociating partner under Section 807(b) if, on the date of 
dissociation, the assets of the partnership were sold at a price equal to the 
greater of liquidation value or going concern value without the departing 
partner. Liquidation value is not intended to mean distress sale value. Under 
general principles of valuation, the hypothetical selling price in either case 
should be the price that a willing and informed buyer would pay a willing and 
informed seller, with neither being under any compulsion to deal. The notion of 
a minority discount in determining the buyout price is negated by valuing the 
business as a going concern. Other discounts, such as for a lack of marketability 
or the loss of a key partner, may be appropriate, however. 
 146. It is noteworthy that the Revised Uniform Partnership Act uses the ―no longer 
reasonably practicable‖ standard for partnership dissolutions.  See Cannon v. Bertrand, 2 So. 
3d 393, 396-97 (La. 2009) (refusing to apply the marketability or minority discount where 
one of three partners withdrew from a Louisiana LLP and indicating that such discounts 
must be used sparingly and only when the facts support their use; also indicating that, under 
the facts, the remaining two partners were not subject to a lack of control as would be the 
case if the withdrawing partner‘s interest were sold to a third party since each of the 
remaining two partners had an equal say in the control of the partnership). 
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LLCs.  Therefore, LLC jurisprudence should be developed in a way that 
maximizes certainty and predictability as much as possible.  To the extent 
that the minority discount contributes to uncertainty, it constitutes a 
provision that runs counter to important overall policy goals underlying 
LLC jurisprudence. 
Valuations in connection with divorce present slightly different policy 
concerns, but many of the objections to the minority discount in oppression 
cases apply with equal force in the context of divorce.  Indeed, there are 
important differences between the divorce and minority squeeze-out 
settings.  In the minority squeeze-out context, the buy-out may be coerced, 
and thus fair market value adjustments—such as discounts that arise 
between a willing buyer and a willing seller—are arguably irrelevant.  
Although there is not always a definitive judicial finding of oppressive 
conduct or fault, there typically is an overriding policy interest in 
protecting the minority investor.  Thus, it is important that the valuation 
process not be used in a manner that facilitates the expulsion of the 
minority. 
In the context of divorce, the overall goal of the proceeding for an 
equitable distribution of property is not to protect one party or the other, 
but rather to fairly and equitably apportion marital property and to 
recognize each party‘s contribution to an economic partnership.
147
  There is 
an overriding concern that the parties honestly disclose the assets that are 
owned.  However, there is not the same concern that discounts might 
operate as incentives for squeeze-out behavior.  Also, in a divorce there 
may be no actual transfer of the business interest.  In a typical minority 
squeeze-out one can argue that the minority discount essentially vanishes 
because, from the perspective of the majority, the majority isn‘t buying a 
minority interest.  However, in a divorce, one party may not be buying out 
a business interest at all.  Thus, the argument that the minority discount 
vanishes does not apply.  The statutory context of the divorce is distinct.  
Also, the relevant divorce statute may not necessarily use the terms ―fair 
value‖ or ―fair market value‖ in authorizing how to reach valuation 
judgments; thus, there may not be a direct statutory connection between 
valuations occurring in divorce and precedents involving corporate 
dissenters‘ rights and/or corporate oppression cases.
148
  As one court 
 
 147. See Benjamin M. Ellis, Protecting the Right to Marital Property: Ensuring a Full 
Equitable Distribution Award With Fraudulent Conveyance Law, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1709, 1720-21 (2009) (observing that the goal of equitable distribution of property is to 
recognize and compensate each spouse for his or her contribution to the economic 
partnership). 
 148. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3502 (2010) (providing court authority to make an 
equitable division of marital property and setting forth factors to consider such as length of 
marriage, prior marriages, age, health, education, etc.; not containing guidelines for 
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recently noted: 
There admittedly is a significant debate about when marketability 
discounts are appropriate in any proceeding requiring the 
valuation of a closely held corporation. . . .  It seems that the 
debate is sometimes led astray by the application of broad 
generalizations that do not differentiate between the types of 
proceedings within which valuations are required, nor 
acknowledge that the appropriate analysis for the valuation of a 
business may change depending upon the specific legal and 
factual context presented.
149
 
Although these comments were made with regard to the marketability 
discount, they are equally applicable to the minority discount. 
In spite of the differences between the squeeze-out and divorce 
settings, there are still some significant objections to the minority discount 
that apply with equal force in both the oppression and divorce contexts.  
The minority discount injects unwarranted uncertainty and a lack of 
predictability in both oppression and divorce LLC cases.  Also, regardless 
of whether the valuation occurs in a squeeze-out or a divorce, an 
adjustment for the minority discount still makes little sense when the 
business itself does not have a market and is unlikely ever to be sold.  Thus, 
although a number of arguments against the minority discount have little 
application to the divorce context, there are still some important reasons 
that support a prohibition of the minority discount in some divorce settings. 
B.   Policy Issues Surrounding the Marketability Discount in the 
Oppression Context and Beyond 
Although the Colorado Supreme Court refused to extend the holding 
of Pueblo Bancorporation, prohibiting the marketability discount to a 
divorce proceeding, some of the policy reasons supporting the disregard of 
the marketability discount appear to make sense in both divorce and 
oppression contexts.
150
  Because of the significance of these problems, even 
 
valuation of property).  See generally Buckl v. Buckl, 542 A.2d 65, 70-71 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1988) (indicating that a partnership interest is part of the marital property and should be 
valued in accordance with the partnership agreement and the relevant Uniform Partnership 
provisions). 
 149. Erp v. Erp, 976 So. 2d 1234, 1239-40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). 
 150. See In re Thornhill, 232 P.3d 782 (Colo. 2010) (holding that trial court may, in its 
discretion, apply marketability discounts when valuing ownership interests in closely-held 
corporations because the Pueblo considerations are not applicable here); Pueblo 
Bancorporation v. Lindoe Inc., 63 P.3d 353, 364-65 (Colo. 2003) (―The purpose of the 
dissenters‘ rights statute would best be fulfilled through an interpretation of ‗fair value‘ 
which ensures minority shareholders are compensated for what they have lost, that is, their 
proportionate ownership interest in a going concern.  A marketability discount is 
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if a court refuses to adopt a general prohibition of discounts in divorce 
proceedings, nevertheless, there may be reasons to disregard the 
marketability discount in individual cases involving an equitable 
distribution of property. 
There may be a number of problems with the marketability discount 
both within and outside of the oppression setting.  Whether the buy-out 
occurs because it is ―no longer practicable‖ to do business or because a 
member simply dissociates from the LLC, the marketability discount 
arguably injects uncertainty into the law.
151
  As indicated above, investors 
may have selected the LLC form precisely to gain some control and 
certainty over legal and business responsibilities.
152
  In addition, the 
marketability discount presents some other problems which may be 
relevant not just in the event of oppression, but also in ordinary 
withdrawals, and even in other settings such as in divorce.  These other 
problems include the double-counting problem observed by at least one 
court,
153
 the undervaluation risk—also called the under-compensation 
risk,
154
 and what I shall call the market irrelevancy issue.  These problems 
tend to support a rule that would disallow the marketability discount. 
The double-counting issue arguably arises if the LLC is valued in a 
manner that already reflects private market data.  As one court noted: 
There is a recognized risk of double-counting by an expert, that 
is, duplicative reductions in the value of the minority interest in a 
closely-held business, as a result of increasing the capitalization 
rate (and decreasing the valuation multiple) to account for limited 
marketability, and then in addition applying a ―marketability 
discount‖ to the value derived from capitalizing income.
155
 
Courts do not always pick up on the problem of double counting the 
reduction necessary to reflect the private nature of the LLC.
156
  For 
 
inconsistent with this interpretation . . . .‖). 
 151. Pueblo Bancorporation, 63 P.3d at 364-65. 
 152. See Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court in Balancing Contractual Freedom 
with the Need for Mandatory Constraints on Opportunistic and Abusive Conduct in the 
LLC, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1609, 1610 (2004) (―[I]n an atmosphere of escalating jury awards, 
practitioners advocated control over the legal liability of their clients with respect to both 
co-investors and third parties.‖). 
 153. See Brown v. Brown, 792 A.2d 463, 475-76 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) 
(observing that an adjustment for the private nature of the firm already had been made in the 
valuation of the underlying business). 
 154. See Moll, supra note 3, at 293 (arguing that the buyout remedy should provide an 
oppressed minority investor with his pro rata share of the company‘s overall value with no 
reductions for the lack of control or liquidity associated with the minority‘s share). 
 155. Brown, 792 A.2d at 475. 
 156. See Balsamides v. Protameen Chems. Inc., 734 A.2d 721 (N.J. 1999) (holding that 
the trial court acted within its discretion in the court-ordered buyout when it valued the 
oppressing shareholder‘s shares using the ―excess earnings‖ method).  But see Brown, 792 
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example, in Balsamides v. Protameen Chems. Inc.,
157
 the New Jersey 
Supreme Court applied a marketability discount in a buy-out case 
occasioned by oppressive conduct.
158
  According to one commentator, the 
valuation expert had already relied upon an IRS Revenue Procedure which 
utilizes an approach specific to the valuation of private business interests.
159
  
The additional application of a marketability discount arguably double 
counted the valuation adjustment due to the private nature of the 
business.
160
 
Some may refute the double-counting rationale for rejecting the 
marketability discount by pointing to the fact that the marketability 
discount is an adjustment for unknown and/or unknowable risks that do not 
necessarily get factored into the underlying valuation of a private company.  
In valuing the underlying business, some valuation experts may adjust 
assets and/or capitalization rates to reflect a variety of risk factors specific 
to the particular business—i.e. poor facilities, aging management, new 
competition, lags in technological advancement, nepotism.  However, these 
risk factors are not necessarily associated with the unknowable risks of 
being locked into an investment without a ready market.  Advocates of the 
marketability discount may take the position that the marketability discount 
is not typically considered in valuing the underlying business and is a 
necessary additional downward adjustment to reflect the risks of ownership 
associated with an illiquid investment.
161
  But one must remember that in a 
buy-out occasioned by a squeeze-out the court is not necessarily trying to 
simulate market conditions, but rather is attempting to provide damages for 
the involuntary deprivation of an investment.  Further, in a divorce context, 
the goal is not necessarily the simulation of market conditions in a 
hypothetical sale, but rather is to arrive at an equitable distribution of 
 
A.2d at 475-76 (adhering to a prohibition on marketability discounts absent extraordinary 
circumstances in divorce cases as well as other types of cases; also indicating that a 
marketability discount would double count the risk associated with the private nature of the 
company.). 
 157. Balsamides, 734 A.2d at 721.  See Charles F. Vuotto & Scott A. Maier, The 
Continuing Debate About Brown: What Constitutes “Extraordinary Circumstances”? 
(2003), http://tvelaw.com/newjerseydivorcearticles/debate.htm (examining when 
―extraordinary circumstances‖ arise such that valuation discounts are warranted). 
 158. Balsamides, 734 A.2d at 737-38. 
 159. Vuotto & Maier, supra note 157. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See R. GLENN HUBBARD, MONEY, THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, AND THE ECONOMY 137 
(Denise Clinton ed. 2008) (―Lenders value liquidity . . . an instrument traded in a less liquid 
market will have a lower price and a greater required return than an instrument traded in a 
more liquid market.‖).  See also LLOYD B. THOMAS, MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL 
MARKETS 129 (Jack Calhoun ed., Thomson 2006) (according to the liquidity premium 
theory, because long-term bonds entail greater market risk—long term yields will pay 
more). 
MILLERFINALIZED_TWO (DO NOT DELETE) 4/28/2011  7:33 PM 
640 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 13:3 
 
property. 
Even if the double counting argument is disregarded, there are still 
other strong reasons to reject the marketability discount in many oppression 
cases.  Particularly where there has been a squeeze-out of an active 
minority investor, a buy-out of the minority‘s interest may not fully 
compensate the minority for the economic rights he or she has lost.
162
  Prof. 
Moll has pointed out this undervaluation risk in his seminal article on 
valuation discounts in the corporate oppression setting.
163
  Prof. Moll quite 
correctly points out that, in a close corporation, the active minority has an 
expectation of future employment, a role in management, and an interest in 
a share of the value of the company.
164
  Prof. Moll argues that the 
minority‘s employment and management interests are not typically 
compensated in the buyout price which makes the minority and/or 
marketability discounts even more inappropriate and unjust in oppression 
cases.
165
 
The undervaluation or ―under-compensation‖ problem to which Prof. 
Moll refers obviously would not occur if the minority is a passive LLC 
member but could arise if the member actively participates in the 
management of the company.  The active LLC member may indeed have 
reasonable expectations of continued employment and an active role in 
management as well as of a share in the future growth of the LLC.
166
 
Unless the plaintiff has sued both for the buy-out price as well as for 
money damages for the loss of future employment, the plaintiff may 
already be losing out on an important segment of his expectation interest.  
Of course, LLC ownership does not present a guarantee of future earnings.  
However, a decline in compensation following the departure from an LLC 
could present a substantial loss for which a buy-out price does not fully 
compensate.  A further reduction for a marketability discount may increase 
his or her loss. 
While the double-counting problem may not exist in all cases, the 
under-compensation issue can be a significant problem for the active 
minority plaintiff.
167
  In addition, what I term ―the market irrelevancy 
issue‖ may arise because the reference to a market is either irrelevant or 
inappropriate, given the facts and circumstances surrounding the LLC in 
 
 162. See Moll, supra note 3, at 297. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 349. 
 166. See Michael K. Molitor, Eat Your Vegetables (Or at Least Understand Why You 
Should): Can Better Warning and Education of Prospective Minority Owners Reduce 
Oppression in Closely Held Businesses?, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 491, 514 (2009) 
(discussing common strategies of oppression). 
 167. See id. 
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dispute.  For example, some private businesses are never intended for sale 
and hold value only to the existing owners.
168
  To make a downward 
adjustment to reflect an irrelevant market makes no sense.  This point was 
recently raised in the case Brown v. Brown,
169
 where the New Jersey 
Superior Court denied a marketability discount to a business with no 
evidence that the business would be sold outside the family in the 
foreseeable future.
170
 
In summary, like the minority discount, the marketability discount 
runs the risk of rewarding oppressive conduct in buy-outs occasioned by 
oppression.  Also, even in contexts not involving oppression, the 
marketability discount may, depending upon the facts, create or exacerbate 
potential problems, including those of uncertainty, double-counting, risk of 
undervaluation, and market irrelevancy.  Given the significance of these 
potential problems, it makes good sense to rule out the marketability 
discount in LLC oppression cases in all but the most extraordinary 
circumstances. 
The Colorado Supreme Court, in the context of a divorce case, took 
the position that a case-by-case approach to the marketability discount may 
be most appropriate.
171
  Nevertheless, the double-counting problem, under-
compensation risk, and market irrelevancy issue may still arise in the 
setting of an equitable distribution.  Whether in the context of a divorce or 
a minority squeeze-out, it is important that the marketability discount not 
be counted twice—first when valuing the underlying business, and again 
when making an adjustment to reflect the lack of marketability.  The under-
compensation risk may be present in both divorce and squeeze-out settings 
as well.  A spouse may derive great value from a private business that is 
not properly accounted for, by looking narrowly at the estimated price for 
which the business interest could be sold.  A spouse may be employed by 
the company and also may derive a broad range of fringe benefits from the 
business.  Children, too, could be employed by the family company.  The 
true value of a business interest to a spouse may already be grossly 
undervalued.  Applying a marketability discount could exacerbate this 
undervaluation problem.  Finally, as indicated previously, the market value 
 
 168. See generally Harry Haynesworth IV, Valuation of Business Interests, 33 MERCER 
L. REV. 457, 459 (1982) (explaining the basic principles of enterprise valuation). 
 169. Brown v. Brown, 792 A.2d 463, 478 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (questioning 
whether a marketability discount should be allowed in a divorce action and concluding that 
extraordinary circumstances did not exist to justify the application of a marketability 
discount). 
 170. See id. 
 171. But see Brown v. Brown, 792 A.2d 463, 477 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) 
(arguing that since no actual transfer of stock would take place in the equitable distribution 
action and no sale of the business appeared likely in the foreseeable future, the marketability 
discount was even less appropriate than in a statutory appraisal or deadlock context). 
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of a business may be irrelevant where it is unlikely that the business would 
or could ever be sold.  This market irrelevancy issue arises regardless of 
whether the valuation question occurs in an oppression case or in a divorce 
proceeding.
172
  Thus, there may be significant reasons to prohibit a 
marketability discount in certain specific divorce cases, if not in all divorce 
proceedings. 
C.   Should Extraordinary Circumstances or Equitable Adjustments Ever 
Be Allowed in the LLC Oppression or Divorce Case? 
As indicated above in the context of an LLC oppression case or a 
dissenters‘ rights case, a strong general rule prohibiting both discounts is 
fitting for efforts to avoid a valuation approach that indirectly facilitates 
minority squeeze-outs.  The divorce context lacks this singularly protective 
focus of the law.  As we have seen, however, a number of the same 
arguments against the minority and marketability discounts appear to be 
relevant in both the oppression and divorce settings.  Are there ever 
circumstances which would justify the imposition of a minority or 
marketability discount or any other discounts in a divorce or oppression 
proceeding?  As alluded to earlier, the Model Business Corporation Act 
prohibits all minority and marketability discounts in the definition of ―fair 
value‖ that governs a buy-out in lieu of a judicial dissolution triggered by 
an oppression suit.
173
  In contrast, the ALI and RUPA both disregard the 
minority discount and the marketability discount, but recognize that there 
might be exceptions for the marketability discount or other discounts in 
extraordinary circumstances.
174
  Yet another albeit minority approach is to 
disregard the minority discount, but to freely allow the marketability 
discount.
175
 
The pervasive weight of authority is clearly to disregard the minority 
discount in oppression, dissenters, and even ordinary dissociation case 
contexts.  Furthermore, given the ALI and RUPA‘s approach to the 
marketability discount, it makes sense to retain a general prohibition on the 
marketability discount in such settings.
176
  The double-counting problem, 
 
 172. Penelope Eileen Bryan, An Interdisciplinary Examination of Coercion, 
Exploitation, and the Law: I. Coercive and Exploitive Bargaining: The Coercion of Women 
in Divorce Settlement Negotiations, 74 DENV. U.L. REV. 931, 932 (1997) (discussing the 
problem of the concealment and/or undervaluation of assets in connection with divorce). 
 173. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.01(4)(iii)(1998) (containing guidelines for the 
determination of fair value without discounting for minority status or lack of marketability). 
 174. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 7.22, at 296 
(2010); REVISED UNIF. P‘SHIP. ACT § 7.01(b), cmt. 3 (1997). 
 175. See supra Part II (referring to the minority approach to the marketability discount 
taken by New York, and seen in some case law in Florida). 
 176. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 7.22 (2010); 
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the under-compensation risk, and the market irrelevancy issue provide 
compelling policy reasons to prohibit the marketability discount in the 
usual LLC buy-out or dissenters case, and possibly in some, if not all 
divorce proceedings. 
In spite of widespread criticism of discounts, some commentators 
have argued that in rare cases, the marketability discount may be 
appropriate to reflect factors such as age, infirmity, or other circumstances 
unique to the LLC owners in question that must be taken into account to 
avoid a gross overstatement of the LLC‘s value.
177
  Thus, there may be 
characteristics of the LLC‘s management, unique features of the LLC‘s 
assets, contractual rights, cash position, or even subsequent extraordinary 
and unforeseeable events that, if not taken into account, could result in a 
significant and unfair overvaluation of the LLC.  Such adjustments appear 
to be extremely important, but they should not be made twice—first in the 
underlying valuation of the company and a second time when a 
marketability discount is then applied once the valuation of the business is 
otherwise determined.
178
 
Moreover, there may be unusual cases where a withdrawing LLC 
member may take goodwill and/or other intellectual property with him.  In 
such instances, the buy-out price paid to the withdrawing LLC member 
might be grossly unfair and overstated without considering the value of the 
intellectual and/or intangible value withdrawn by the dissociating LLC 
member himself.
179
  The Comments to the Revised Uniform Partnership 
Act appear to recognize the possibility of discounts other than the minority 
discount and mention the key man discount.
180
  Indeed, such discounts may 
be a critical way to arrive at an appropriate value in certain instances.  
Finally, it seems reasonable that courts should have some discretion 
regarding payments or payment terms within reason, to arrive at a fair 
resolution, particularly where an equitable proceeding is involved. 
 
REVISED UNIF. P‘SHIP. ACT § 701 (1997). 
 177. See Vuotto & Maier, supra note 157 (exploring what facts should constitute 
extraordinary circumstances to give rise to the application of discounts in business 
valuations). 
 178. However, one would expect that if the underlying valuation of the company is 
properly done, such unique features already would be taken into account in the underlying 
valuation of the company, making it unnecessary to again reflect the factors in the form of a 
marketability discount. 
 179. Some courts, however, have taken the position that consideration of goodwill in the 
valuation process is inappropriate because the goodwill belongs to the enterprise and is not 
an asset belonging to the individual participant.  See Brown v. Corrugated Box, Inc., 91 Cal. 
App. 3d 477, 488 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that the loss of goodwill that would occur if 
a controlling shareholder were to leave should not be considered in valuing a company upon 
disassociation by minority shareholders). 
 180. REVISED UNIF. P‘SHIP. ACT § 701, cmt3 (1997).  
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/uparta/1997act_final.htm. 
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As indicated in Part IV.B, the ALI provides that in the corporate 
arena, the marketability discount should be disallowed in the appraisal 
remedy except in extraordinary cases.
181
  If without the marketability 
discount there would be an unfair wealth transfer from the remaining 
shareholders to the departing LLC member, it has been argued that the 
marketability discount should apply.
182
  According to the ALI Comments, 
this exception is limited to cases where a dissenting shareholder has held 
out to exploit the transaction giving rise to the appraisal, so as to divert 
value to his or her self at the expense of other shareholders.
183
  The ALI 
Comment posits that a minority shareholder who exploits a relatively minor 
certificate change can trigger an appraisal.  The appraisal‘s fair value will 
likely be higher than the company‘s fair market value, due to the 
company‘s financially troubled, illiquid condition.
184
 
Although the ALI Comment is somewhat obtuse, it appears to address 
a situation involving bad faith or manipulation on the part of a minority.  
Perhaps a similar type of manipulation could occur in connection with an 
LLC.  Some LLC statutes contain dissenter‘s rights.
185
  Perhaps a 
manipulative minority LLC member could seek an appraisal to obtain a 
higher buy-out price where the fair market value would be lower because, 
for example, the LLC is operating under severe cash constraints.  One 
could posit a situation in which a minority LLC member attempts to exploit 
an oppression remedy in bad faith in an effort to get cashed out quickly 
prior to an upcoming sale that is likely to occur at a depressed price due to 
possible managerial problems or other impediments that are not likely to be 
reflected in an underlying formal valuation of the LLC.  In such cases 
involving bad faith manipulation, one approach might be to allow a 
discount because of the extraordinary circumstances.  The problem, 
however, with creating this exception is the difficulty in defining 
extraordinary circumstances and the potential for re-introducing the very 
uncertainty that a general prohibition on discounts is intended to avoid. 
An alternative approach might be to handle instances of bad 
faith/misconduct through the imposition of punitive damages and/or to 
 
 181. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 7.22 (2010). 
 182. Advanced Commc‘n Design v. Follett, 615 N.W. 2d 285, 292 (Minn. 2000). 
 183. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 7.22, at cmt 
e (2010). 
 184. See id. 
 185. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 17604 (Deering 2010) (providing for dissenters‘ rights with 
fair market value payment); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.4352 (LexisNexis 2010) (providing for 
appraisal rights subject to limitations); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-603(a) (2010) (providing 
that the court may decree dissolution of a limited liability company); MINN. STAT. § 
322B.386 (2007) (using the term fair value); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-54 (2010) (using the 
term fair value); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1705.40, 1705.41 (LexisNexis 2010) (using the 
term fair cash value); WASH. REV. CODE § 25.15.430 (2010) (using the term fair value). 
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permit the award of court costs and attorney‘s fees.  Counterclaims for 
tortious conduct might also be justified in certain extreme cases.  
Addressing misconduct through punitive damage awards, the award of 
court costs, and/or through counterclaims may be more honest and 
transparent than using a discount factor as a ―catch-all‖ adjustment to 
punish one of the parties.
186
  For example, in Balsamides v. Protameen 
Chems. Inc.,
187
 two fifty-percent owners of a corporation began feuding 
when they brought their sons into their business.
188
  The feud degenerated 
into physical violence.
189
  The case was an unusual one because Balsamides 
was not a minority owner, yet was considered an oppressed shareholder 
under New Jersey‘s applicable oppression statute.  In an unusual twist, the 
court ordered Balsamides, the oppressed party, to purchase the shares of 
Perle, the other fifty-percent owner.
190
  The New Jersey Supreme Court 
affirmed the use of a marketability discount which had the effect of 
lowering the price at which plaintiff was to purchase the defendant‘s stock.  
The court in effect decided that it should take into account fairness and 
equity and on that basis, it was equitable to give Balsamides a minority 
discount in the price he should pay Perle.
191
 
The Balsamides decision has been criticized for being inappropriately 
punitive, and such criticism appears to be well-deserved.
192
  The 
marketability discount should not be used as a punitive measure in an 
indirect manner which in effect imposes hidden punitive damages.  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court has similarly struggled to define extraordinary 
circumstances justifying a marketability discount in the context of 
oppression.  In Advanced Communication Design v. Follett,
193
 the 
Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that the marketability discount should 
apply to the corporation‘s buy-out of the minority shareholder.  The 
marketability discount was necessary to prevent an unfair transfer of wealth 
to the minority shareholder.
194
  Without the marketability discount, the 
 
 186. See Mullenberg v. Bikon Corp., 669 A. 2d 1382, 1390 (N.J. 1996) (ordering the 
minority to buy-out the majority). See also Moll, supra note 3, at 297 (discussing the 
considerable disagreement regarding the appropriateness of a discount). 
 187. Balsamides v. Protameen Chems. Inc., 734 A.2d 721 (N.J. 1999) 
 188. Id. at 721-22. 
 189. Id. at 723-24. 
 190. Id. at 723.  See also id. at 725-726 (discussing defendant‘s refusal to provide 
technical information to customers, his refusal to stock inventory that plaintiff‘s customers 
ordered, his sale of carbopol to his son in violation of a distribution agreement with a major 
customer, and defendant‘s son‘s disparaging treatment of plaintiff intending to embarrass 
plaintiff and harm his relationships with customers). 
 191. Vuotto and Maier, supra note 157. 
 192. Moll, supra note 3, at 297. 
 193. See Advanced Comm‘n Design v. Follett, 615 N.W.2d 285, 289 (Minn. 2000) 
(discussing the appropriateness of a marketability discount). 
 194. Id. at 285. 
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valuation would have been more than five times the total net worth of the 
corporation and seven times its average annual net income.
195
  According to 
the Minnesota Supreme Court, several factors should be considered in the 
determination of whether extraordinary circumstances warrant the 
marketability discount.  Such factors include whether the buying or selling 
shareholder has acted in a manner that is unfairly oppressive or has reduced 
the value of the company, whether the oppressed shareholder has additional 
remedies, and whether any condition of the buy-out, including price, would 
be unfair to the remaining shareholders because it would be unduly 
burdensome to the company.
196
 
It is commendable that the court did not accept an obviously 
misguided value for the business in question in Advanced Communication 
Design.  However, guidelines on the issue of valuation should not turn on 
whether the controlling shareholder engaged in unfairly prejudicial 
conduct.  The nature and scope of the alleged oppressive conduct is 
relevant to the question of whether the minority should be entitled to the 
remedy of a judicial dissolution or buy-out, but should not have a bearing 
on the valuation question. 
Perhaps in substance, the court in Advanced Communication Design is 
not really applying a discount as such, but rather is making its own 
equitable adjustments based upon the facts and circumstances presented 
and the parties‘ misconduct in the case.  Such judicial adjustments could 
inject an unfortunate degree of uncertainty and lack of predictability in the 
valuation process that is particularly inappropriate for LLCs.  As indicated 
above, a more direct and honest approach to misconduct may be to seek 
court costs, attorney‘s fees, and/or an award of punitive damages as an 
offset to the purchase price, or to encourage a counterclaim for damages 
where there has been tortious conduct or a breach of contract. 
In summary, it is appropriate for the valuation of a privately-held 
business to take into account special features that are unique to the 
business, whether having to do with the age or quality of management, 
unique contractual rights, or facts and circumstances dealing with goodwill.  
If a minority investor is taking goodwill with him, the valuation of the 
business should be adjusted accordingly.  However, these sorts of 
adjustments should not be made twice—first in the determination of the 
underlying value of the business and then again by applying a discount.  
Also, in an equitable proceeding, some judicial discretion in the interests of 
fairness and equity may be appropriate regarding payment terms, etc.  
However, a broad exception to the prohibition on the marketability 
discount for ―extraordinary circumstances‖ is not recommended because it 
 
 195. Id. at 293-94. 
 196. Id. 
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would reintroduce uncertainty in the LLC valuation process.  It is true that 
the objectives of fairness and equity should not be overlooked in 
connection with valuations arising in oppression cases or divorce— 
―leaving fairness out of the law is a little like asking Mrs. Lincoln if she 
otherwise liked the show.‖
197
  However, if there has been bad faith, a 
breach of contract, or tortious conduct, it should be dealt with 
straightforwardly, and an award of compensatory and/or punitive damages 
should be sought. 
D.   Judicial Guidance Specific to the LLC 
Many courts are likely to confront the minority discount dilemma as a 
question of first impression when involving an LLC investor.  In deciding 
how to value the LLC investor‘s LLC interest, courts should first consider 
the provisions contained in the LLC operating agreement given the 
contractual mandate and contractual orientation of most LLC legislation.
198
  
Many statutes expressly reflect a policy of giving maximum effect to the 
terms of the LLC operating agreement.
199
  Absent fraud or bad faith or 
other unforeseen special circumstances, courts should make every effort to 
enforce the buy-out valuation terms contained in the LLC operating 
agreement.
200
  Absent guidance from an LLC operating agreement, the 
 
 197. C.A.E. Goodhart, Economics, and the Law: Too Much One-Way Traffic?  60 MOD. 
L. REV. 1, 12 (1997).  See also Miller, supra note 152, at 1650 (citing Goodhart). 
 198. See Elf Atochem Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286 (Del. 1999) (emphasizing the 
contractual policy underlying the Delaware LLC statute and the intent to give the parties the 
discretion to contractually define their relationship).  See also Am. Aglian Envtl. Techs. v. 
Envtl. Mgmt. Corp., 412 F. 3d 956, 962 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that provisions in an 
operating agreement are designed to achieve finality); Bootheel Ethanol Inv., LLC v. Semo 
Ethanol Coop., No. 1:08CV59SNLJ, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11380, at *7-9 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 
17, 2009) (emphasizing the role of the contract). 
 199. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-108(4) (2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) 
(2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-76, 134(b) (2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-1201(2) (2010); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:78(II) (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-66(a) (West 2010); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2058(D) (West 2010); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8913 (West 
2010) (comment on paragraph 8); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1901 (LexisNexis 2010); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 25.15.800(2) (LexisNexis 2010). 
 200. Some state legislation expressly refers to the parties‘ relevant contractual 
provisions.  See N.D. CENT. CODE  § 10-32-119 (2)(a) (2008) (―If the articles of 
organization, a member-control agreement, or another agreement state a price for the 
redemption or buyout of membership interests, the court shall order the sale for the price 
and on the terms set forth, unless the court determines that the price or terms are 
unreasonable under all the circumstances of the case.‖).  See also 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. § 180/35-65 (LexisNexis 2008) (indicating that the court should ―determine the fair 
value of the interest, considering among other relevant evidence the going concern value of 
the company, any agreement among some or all of the members fixing the price or 
specifying a formula for determining value of distributional interests for any other purpose, 
the recommendations of any appraiser appointed by the court, and any legal constraints on 
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court should next consider whether the applicable LLC statute contains 
valuation provisions that become operative in the absence of an operating 
agreement.  In interpreting buy-out language contained in the LLC statute, 
prior interpretations under both the jurisdiction‘s corporate and/or 
partnership statutes may be helpful. 
As indicated earlier, except for California and Utah which expressly 
state that the buyout of the LLC interest should be at fair market value, 
most LLC statutes are silent as to how the dissociating member‘s interest 
should be valued.
201
  Under these circumstances, courts should look to the 
state‘s corporate oppression and dissenters‘ rights precedents as well as the 
state‘s partnership dissociation provisions.  It may be helpful to factor in 
the policy reasons described above in support of a general prohibition of 
the minority and marketability discounts in the oppression context and 
possibly, in the divorce setting as well.
202
 
 
the company‘s ability to purchase the interest‖); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.833 Sub. 2 (West 
2010) (discussing the court‘s ability to, upon motion by a limited liability company or a 
member, order a sale of membership interests). 
 201. See infra Appendix E. 
 202. See supra Part VI; Swope v. Siegel-Robert, Inc., 243 F.3d 486, 493 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(finding that the lower court did not err in declining to apply a marketability discount); 
Arnaud v. Stockgrowers State Bank of Ashland Kansas, 992 P.2d 216 (Kan. 1999) 
(indicating that fair value should be used and minority and marketability discounts not 
applied in a case involving a reverse stock split that was deliberately designed to squeeze 
out the minority shareholders because application of the discounts would have penalized the 
minority and unfairly enriched the majority); Joseph W. Anthony & Karlyn V. Boraas, 
Betrayed, Belittled . . . But Triumphant: Claims of Shareholders in Closely Held 
Corporations, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1173, 1186 (1996) (discussing that there is no 
ready market for closely held corporations); Marilyn B. Cane & Peter Ferola, An Appraisal 
of “Fair Value” in the Revised Corporate Appraisal Statute Section 1.01, Model Business 
Corporation Act, 30 NOVA L. REV. 333, 347 (2006) (arguing that the 1998 Revised Model 
Corporation Act (RMBCA) indicates that discounts are inappropriate in appraisal 
transactions as a whole in MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.01(4) & cmt. 2); John C. Coates, 
“Fair Value” as an Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in Conflict 
Transactions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1255 (1999) (discussing the importance and 
unpredictability of the minority discount); Harry J. Haynsworth, Valuation of Business 
Interests, 33 MERCER L. REV. 457, 459 (1982) (showing that in an oppression setting there is 
no willing seller and buyer); William S. Monnin-Browder, Are Discounts Appropriate?:  
Valuing Shares in Close Corporations for the Purpose of Remedying Breach of Fiduciary 
Duty Under Massachusetts Law, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 723, 734 (2007) (discussing several 
rationales offered by courts in rejecting application of discounts); Barry M. Wertheimer, The 
Shareholders Appraisal Remedy and How Courts Determine Fair Value, 47 DUKE L.J. 613, 
636-37 (1998) (discussing the unreliability of market price due to fluctuations and 
susceptibility to manipulation by insiders or majority shareholders). 
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VI.  LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS: THE PURCHASE IN LIEU OF 
DISSOLUTION 
To facilitate the efficient resolution of LLC member disputes, it is 
suggested that LLC judicial dissolution provisions be amended to include a 
buyout option in lieu of a judicial dissolution of the entity.  This 
amendment would harmonize LLC provisions with many corporate 
oppression statutes.
203
  Such a provision should be incorporated into the 
Uniform Limited Liability Company Statute.
204
  In addition, states should 
consider harmonizing the valuation language among their partnership, 
corporate, and LLC statutes.  The National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws has recently begun a project to harmonize business 
entity legislation.
205
  A review of LLC and corporate judicial dissolution 
provisions reveals that most LLC statutes do not contain provisions for a 
buyout in lieu of a judicial dissolution and many are silent with regard to 
how a valuation would proceed if a buyout were to occur.
206
 
In many of the states in which the LLC statute is silent regarding 
valuation, there are corporate statutes that do address valuation in corporate 
dissolution provisions and/or corporate dissenters‘ rights provisions.  It 
would be helpful to courts if legislatures rationalized these differences.  A 
number of states such as Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, 
Maine, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and West 
Virginia have an express LLC judicial dissolution that does not authorize a 
buyout in lieu of a judicial dissolution.  These states, however, do have 
corporate mechanisms that offer a buyout at ―fair value‖ in lieu of a judicial 
dissolution.
207
 
Minnesota and North Dakota are in the minority by having consistent 
LLC and corporate provisions that offer a buyout at fair value in lieu of 
judicial dissolution.  Such symmetry is usually lacking.  The Utah LLC 
statute uses ―fair market value‖ in its LLC statute governing the purchase 
 
 203. See infra Appendix D.  Harry Haynsworth IV, Chair of the Harmonization 
Committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, has long 
recommended this type of buyout in lieu of dissolution provisions. See NAT‘L CONF. OF 
COMM‘RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HARMONIZED BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS ACT (2011), 
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/hobe/2011jan_huba.pdf (proposing a 
harmonized single code of entity laws). 
 204. Although the Uniform Limited Liability Company Statute includes a judicial 
dissolution provision triggering a right to a judicial dissolution in the event of unfairly 
prejudicial or oppressive conduct, it does not include an express mechanism authorizing a 
buyout in lieu of a judicial dissolution. 
 205. NAT‘L CONF. OF COMM‘RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HARMONIZED BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS ACT, available at  
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/CommitteeSearchResults.aspx?committee=336. 
 206. See infra Appendix E.  
 207. Id. 
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of an LLC interest in lieu of a dissolution, but uses ―fair value‖ in 
comparable corporate provisions and in its corporate appraisal statute.
208
  
As in Florida, different statutory language governing judicial dissolutions 
may appear in corporate and LLC statutes and still other statutory valuation 
formulations may appear in the state‘s corporate statutory appraisal 
provisions.  I suggest that legislators compare buyout provisions in a state‘s 
corporate appraisal provisions, corporate dissolution provisions, and in 
partnership statutes. 
In addition, the judicial dissolution provisions of the Revised Model 
Business Corporation Statute and the Revised Uniform Limited Liability 
Company Act should be revisited.  As already mentioned, the Revised 
Model Business Corporation Act provides for a buyout at fair value in lieu 
of a dissolution, whereas the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Act does 
not.
209
  Purchase in lieu of dissolution is a highly desirable provision 
because it holds the promise of reducing complex and protracted litigation 
leading up to the buyout.  Given the policy analyses offered above, I 
suggest that the Revised Model Business Corporation Act and the Revised 
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act should be harmonized to prohibit 
the minority and marketability discounts generally, subject to an exception 
for the marketability discount in extraordinary instances—an approach that 
would be largely consistent with the ALI and the UPA. 
All members of the legal community, whether legislators, lawyers, or 
courts, should be mindful that creditors and the public at large have vested 
interests in the financial vitality of privately-owned businesses and the 
timely and successful resolution of internal disputes.  The latest financial 
crisis highlights the interrelatedness of business enterprises and the degree 
to which the health of one business can affect that of another.  Swift and 
viable buyout arrangements are in the best interest of all stakeholders in the 
economy.  Some legislation has attempted to encourage flexible buyout 
terms by authorizing courts to provide for installment sales where it is in 
the interest of equity to do so.
210
  Further, it may be helpful to incorporate 
language that awards reasonable attorneys fees and the fees of appraisers or 
other experts where one of the parties has acted arbitrarily or not in good 
faith.  The statutory authorization of punitive damages may be another tool 
 
 208. Compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2C-1214 (LexisNexis 2010) (applying ―fair market 
value‖ in elections to purchase in lieu of dissolution of an LLC) with UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-
10a-1434 (LexisNexis 2010) (applying ―fair value‖ in comparable provision). 
 209. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 701(a)(5), available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ullca/2006act_final.htm (providing for 
dissolution upon application by a member). 
 210. See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 10-32-119(2) (2010) (providing for the court to use 
equitable discretion in determining an installment payment schedule where parties have 
failed to agree). 
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to deter obstructionist or deceptive conduct that unnecessarily prolongs and 
complicates disputes arising in the divorce or oppression contexts.
211
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Against the backdrop of soaring LLC filings, judicial and legislative 
guidelines are needed to determine the value of an LLC interest in 
controversies involving LLC dissenters‘ rights, LLC oppression cases, and 
in suits for an equitable distribution of property.  There is a split of 
authority in valuation guidelines under the Model Business Corporation 
Act on one hand, and under the American Principles of Corporate 
Governance and the Uniform Partnership Act on the other.  This article 
argues that the minority discount should be disregarded in LLC oppression 
and dissenters‘ rights cases because such buyouts are coercive, there is a 
need to deter oppressive majority conduct, and the minority discount injects 
uncertainty into the valuation process.  The goal of such buyouts is not to 
closely simulate a market sale, but rather, to provide a sensible remedy for 
the deprivation of an investment that the LLC owner would have otherwise 
continued to own.  The need to deter oppressive conduct by a prohibition of 
the minority discount is lacking in the divorce context, but the uncertainty 
problem is present in divorce as well as in oppression contexts.  Similarly, 
the marketability discount should be disregarded as a general rule in 
oppression cases and in divorce contexts to prevent double-counting the 
impact of a restricted market, to avoid under-compensating the active 
minority or the spouse of a minority owner, and to preclude market-related 
adjustments for family firms to which outside markets are largely 
irrelevant.  Although adjustments to value appear appropriate in 
recognition of the unique characteristics of management and to reflect the 
specific facts and circumstances surrounding goodwill, such adjustments 
should not be made twice—first when valuing the underlying business and 
then again through a discount.  Judicial discretion to achieve reasonable 
and equitable payment terms may be appropriate in an equitable 
proceeding; however, a broadly-conceived exception for a marketability 
discount based on ―extraordinary circumstances‖ is not recommended.  
 
 211. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 61-1-701 (2010) (providing for the award of reasonable 
attorney‘s fees and the fees and other expenses of appraiser or other experts in the amount 
the court finds equitable against the party who has acted arbitrarily, vexatiously, or not in 
good faith).  See also VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73 (2010) (providing for award of reasonable 
attorney‘s fees and other expenses for circumstances matching the statutory language of 
Tennessee); WASH. REV. CODE § 25.05.250 (2010) (providing for the award of reasonable 
attorney‘s fees and other expenses for circumstances matching the statutory language of 
Tennessee); W. VA. CODE § 47B-7-1 (LexisNexis 2009) (providing for award of reasonable 
attorney‘s fees and other expenses for circumstances matching the statutory language of 
Tennessee). 
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Counterclaims for tortious conduct, the award of punitive damages, and a 
demand for court costs or attorney‘s fees may be an important way of 
deterring bad faith and/or opportunistic conduct on either side of a divorce 
or oppression action.  The award of punitive damages or a well-fashioned 
counterclaim for tortious conduct may provide a more appropriate and 
transparent means of addressing misconduct than a hazy application of a 
―catch-all‖ marketability discount.  Specific statutory recommendations 
should be considered to rationalize differences among partnership, 
corporate, and LLC statutes and to deter bad faith and obstructive or 
deceptive conduct. 
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APPENDIX A 
LLC Statutes Nationwide 
STATE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Alabama ALA. CODE §§ 10-12-1 to -61 (LexisNexis 1999 & Supp. 
2004)  
Alaska ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.50.010–.995 (2004)  
Arizona ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 29-601 to -857 (LexisNexis 1998 & 
Supp. 2007) 
Arkansas ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-32-101 to -1401 (2001 & Supp. 
2005) 
California CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 17000–17656 (Deering 2006 & Supp. 
2008) 
Colorado COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-80-101 to -1101 (West 2007)  
Connecticut CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-100 to -242 (West 2005 & 
Supp. 2006) 
Delaware DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-101 to -1109 (2005 & Supp. 
2006) 
District of Columbia D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-1001 to -1075 (LexisNexis 2001 & 
Supp. 2007) 
Florida FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.401–.705 (West 2007 & Supp. 
2008) 
Georgia GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-11-100 to -1109 (2003 & Supp. 2005) 
Hawaii HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 428-101 to -1302 (2004 & Supp. 2007) 
Idaho IDAHO CODE ANN. §§30-6-101 to -1104 (LexisNexis 2010) 
effective after 7/1/10, subject to transition rules; formerly 
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 53-601 to -672 (2000 & Supp. 2005) 
Illinois 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/1-1 to /60-1 (West 2004 & 
Supp. 2007) 
Indiana IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-18-1-1 to -13-1 (LexisNexis 1999 & 
Supp. 2005) 
Iowa IOWA CODE ANN. §§489.101-.1304 (LexisNexis 2010) 
adopting the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company 
Act; formerly IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 490A.100–.1601 (West 
1999 & Supp. 2007)(2) 
Kansas KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7662 to -76,142 (Supp. 2006) 
Kentucky KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 275.001–.540 (West 2006 & Supp. 
2007) 
Louisiana LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1301–:1369 (1994 & Supp. 
2008) 
Maine ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §§ 601–762 (1996 & Supp. 
2007) 
MILLERFINALIZED_TWO (DO NOT DELETE) 4/28/2011  7:33 PM 
654 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 13:3 
 
Maryland MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. ASSN‘S §§ 4A-101 to 1103 
(LexisNexis 1999 & Supp. 2005) 
Massachusetts MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156C, §§ 1–69 (West 2005 & 
Supp. 2007) 
Michigan MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.4101-.5200 (West 2002 & 
Supp. 2007) 
Minnesota MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 322B.01-.960 (West 2004 & Supp. 
2008) 
Mississippi MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 79-29-101 to -127 (LexisNexis 2010) 
effective from and after Jan. 1, 2010; see also MISS. CODE 
ANN. §§ 79-29-101 to -1204 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007) 
effective until Jan 1, 2011   
Missouri MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 347.010-.740 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008) 
Montana MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-8-101 to -1307 (2005) 
Nebraska NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2601 to -2653 (Reissue 1989 & 
Cum. Supp. 2006) 
Nevada NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 86.011–.590 (2007) 
New Hampshire N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304-C:1-:85, §§ 304-D:1-:20 
(LexisNexis 2005) 
New Jersey N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:2B-1 to -70 (West 2004) 
New Mexico N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-19-1 to -74 (LexisNexis 2001 & 
Supp. 2005) 
New York N.Y.LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW §§ 101 to 1403 (McKinney 2007 
& Supp. 2008) 
North Carolina N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 57C-1-01 to -10-07 (2003) 
North Dakota N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-32-01 to -156 (2007) 
Ohio OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1705.01 – .58 (LexisNexis 2001) 
Oklahoma OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, §§ 2000 to 2060 (West 1999 & Supp. 
2007) 
Oregon OR. REV. STAT. §§ 63.001-.990 (2003) 
Pennsylvania 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8901 to 8998 (West 1995 & 
Supp. 2007) 
Rhode Island R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-16-1 to -75 (1999 & Supp. 2005) 
South Carolina S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-44-101 to -1208 (2006 & Supp. 
2007) 
South Dakota S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 47-34A-101 to -1207 (2007) 
Tennessee TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-249-101 to -48-249-1133 
(LexisNexis 2010)   
Texas TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. §§ 101.001–.552 (Vernon 
2007) 
Utah UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2C-101 to -1902 (2002 & Supp. 
2005) 
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Vermont VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 3001 to 3184 (2007) 
Virginia VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1000 to -1123 (1999 & Supp. 2005) 
Washington WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 25.15.005-.902 (West 2005 & 
Supp. 2007) 
West Virginia W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 31B-1-101 to -13-1306 (LexisNexis 
2003 & Supp. 2005) 
Wisconsin WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 183.0102–.1305 (West 2002 & Supp. 
2007) 
Wyoming WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-15-101 to -147 (2007); see also 
Wyoming Close Limited Liability Company Supplement 17-
25-101 to -111 (LexisNexis 2010)  
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APPENDIX B 
LLC Dissolution in Event of Deadlock, Oppressive Behavior or Other 
Stated Misconduct 
STATE STATUTORY PROVISION 
Arizona  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 29-785 A.2-A4 cmt. A (LexisNexis 
2007)  Comment a * 
California CAL. CORP. CODE  17351(a)(2), (4), (5) (LexisNexis 2007)  
Comment b * 
Florida FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.449(b)(2) (LexisNexis 2007) Comment c 
Hawaii HAW. REV. STAT. § 428-801(E) (LexisNexis 2007)  
Comment d * 
Idaho IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-6-701(e)(2009) * 
Iowa IOWA CODE ANN. § 489.701(e)(2009) * 
Illinois 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/35-1(4)(E) (LexisNexis 2007) 
Comment f * 
Kansas KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-76,117 (LexisNexis 2007) Comment g 
Maine ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §702(2007) Comment h 
Michigan MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.4802 & 450.4803 (West 2007) 
Comment i 
Minnesota MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 322B.833 (LexisNexis 2006) Comment j 
Mississippi  MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 79-29-802(b) (LexisNexis 2007)  
Comment k * 
Missouri MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 347.143(1) (LexisNexis 2007) Comment l * 
Montana MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-8-902(1)(e) (2005) Comment d * 
New Hampshire N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304-C:51 (LexisNexis 2007) 
Comment m 
North Carolina N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 57C-6-02 (2008) Comment n 
North Dakota N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-32-119 (2007) Comment o 
Oregon OR. REV. STAT. 63.661(1)(2005) Comment p 
South Carolina S.C. CODE ANN. §33-44-801 (LexisNexis 2006) Comment q * 
South Dakota S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 47-34A-801(a)(4)(iv) (LexisNexis 
2007) Comment d * 
Tennessee * TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-249-616 (LexisNexis 2008)  
Comment r 
Utah UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2c-1210 (LexisNexis 2007)  
Comment s * 
Vermont VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 3001 (5)(E) (LexisNexis 2007) 
Comment d * 
West Virginia W.VA. CODE §§ 31B-1-801(b)(5)(v) (LexisNexis 2007)  
Comment d * 
Wisconsin WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 183.0902(4) (LexisNexis 2006) Comment d 
Wyoming WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-29-701 (2007) Comment t * 
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 * Also contains not reasonably practicable language 
a. Agreement can alter; deadlock, illegal or fraudulent behavior, 
waste, misapplication or diversion of assets. 
b. Reasonably necessary for protection of rights of complaining 
members; persistent and pervasive fraud, mismanagement, or abuse 
of authority. Excludes term ―oppressive.‖ 
c. Deadlock, misappropriation or waste of assets. Excludes term 
―oppressive.‖ 
d. Illegal, oppressive, fraudulent, or unfairly prejudicial. 
e. Deadlock, illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent and irreparable injury 
suffered or threatened. 
f. Illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent conduct. 
g. Irreparable harm, deadlock language. 
h. Deadlock, illegal or fraudulent conduct, misapplication or waste of 
assets, abandonment of business. 
i. Whenever company is unable to carry on business in conformity 
with articles or operating agreement.  Where Procured articles by 
fraud, repeatedly and willfully exceed authority, conduct business 
unlawfully; statute doesn‘t exclude other statutory or common law 
grounds for dissolution. 
j. Governors or those in control acted fraudulently, illegally, or 
unfairly prejudicial in capacities as members or governors or as 
managers or employees of a closely held LLC, an LLC having no 
more than 35 members as defined per 322B.03. 
k. Knowingly countenanced persistent and pervasive fraud, abuse of 
authority, persistent unfairness toward any member, or 
misapplication or waste of property. 
l. Procured articles through fraud, exceeded legal authority, 
conducted business in fraudulent or illegal manner, abuse of 
powers contrary to public policy. 
m. Deadlock and irreparable damage or affairs no longer conducted to 
company‘s advantage or procured articles through fraud, exceeded 
legal authority, committed violation that forfeits certificate, 
conducted business in fraudulent or illegal manner, or abuse of 
powers contrary to public policy. 
n. Deadlock and irreparable injury, or deadlock and business no 
longer conducted to the advantage of members, liquidation 
necessary to protect rights of complaining member, assets 
misapplied or wasted, or articles or LLC agreement entitle 
complaining members to the dissolution. 
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o. Deadlock, fraudulent, illegal, or unfairly prejudicial conduct as 
managers or employees of a closely held LLC, or divided and 
failure to elect successors, misapplication or waste of assets; 
closely held LLC defined as a company that does not have more 
than 35 members per 10-32-02. 
p. Obtained articles by fraud, exceed or abuse authority, or not 
reasonably practicable. 
q. Event makes it unlawful to continue, or decree that economic 
purpose frustrated, another‘s conduct makes it not reasonably 
practicable to carry on, it is not otherwise reasonably practicable to 
carry on, unlawful, oppressive, fraudulent, or unfairly prejudicial 
conduct. 
r. Misconduct is not identified but court is given power to grant 
equitable relief it considers just and reasonable in the 
circumstances and/or may direct the dissolved entity be merged 
into another or a new entity on terms and conditions it deems 
equitable. 
s. Obtained articles by fraud, exceed authority, violate a law that 
forfeits charter, carry on business in a persistently fraudulent or 
illegal manner, abuse of powers, fail to amend articles as required, 
deadlock, and irreparable injury or affairs no longer conducted to 
advantage of members, or deadlock for at least 6 months; managers 
or those in control acting illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent; 
misapplication or waste of assets, creditor provision. Election to 
purchase in lieu of dissolution at 48-2C-1214. 
t. Applies to LLCs that have not elected to be a closely held LLC 
under Wyoming‘s Close Limited Liability Company Supplement.  
LLCs that have elected close LLC status, dissolution occurs only 
upon the expiration of the period fixed for the duration of the 
company, the unanimous agreement of all members, or upon the 
occurrence of events specified in the operating agreement. WYO. 
STAT. 17-25-108 (2010). 
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APPENDIX C 
Judicial Dissolution Where Not Reasonably Practicable to Carry on 
Business 
STATE STATUTORY PROVISION 
Alabama  ALA. CODE ANN. § 10-12-38 (LexisNexis 2007) 
Alaska  ALASKA CODE § 10.50.405 (LexisNexis 2007) 
Arizona  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-785 A.1. (LexisNexis 2007) 
Arkansas  ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-902 (LexisNexis 2007) 
California CAL. CORP. CODE § 17351(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2007)  
Colorado COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-80-810 (LexisNexis 2007) 
Connecticut CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-207 (West 2007) 
Delaware DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-802 (LexisNexis 2007) 
District of Columbia D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-1048 (LexisNexis 2007) 
Florida FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.441(3) (LexisNexis 2007) 
Georgia GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-11-603(a) (LexisNexis 2007) 
Hawaii HAW. REV. STAT. tit. 23A §§ 428-801(4)(A),(B), and (C) 
(LexisNexis 2007) Comment a 
Illinois 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/35-1(4)(A)-(C)(LexisNexis 
2007) Comment a 
Indiana IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-18-9-2 (LexisNexis 2007) 
Idaho  IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-6-701(d) (2009)  
Iowa IOWA CODE ANN. §489.701(1)(d)(2) (2009)  
Kentucky KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 275.290 (LexisNexis 2007) 
Louisiana La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 12:1335 (2007) 
Maryland MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. ASS‘NS §§ 4A-903 (LexisNexis 
2007) 
Massachusetts MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156C, §44 (LexisNexis 2007) 
Comment b 
Michigan MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.4802 (West 2007) 
Mississippi MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 79-29-802(a) (LexisNexis 2007) 
Missouri MO. ANN. STAT. § 347.143(2) (LexisNexis 2007) 
Montana MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-8-902 (1)(c) (2007) 
Nebraska NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-2622(2) (LexisNexis 2007) 
Nevada NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 86.495 (LexisNexis 2007) 
New Jersey N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:2B-49 (LexisNexis 2007) 
New Mexico N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-19-40 (LexisNexis 2007) 
New York N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW §702 (McKinney 2007) 
Ohio OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1705.47 (LexisNexis 2007) 
Oklahoma OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, §§ 2038 (LexisNexis 2007) 
Oregon OR. REV. STAT. §§ 63.661(2) (2005) 
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Pennsylvania 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8972 (LexisNexis 2006) 
Rhode Island R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-16-40 (2007) 
South Carolina S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-44-801(4)(c) (LexisNexis 2006) 
South Dakota S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 47-34A-801(4)(i)-(iii) 
(LexisNexis 2007) 
Tennessee  TENN. CODE ANN § 48-249-617 (LexisNexis 2008) 
Texas TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. §§ 11.314(2) (LexisNexis 
2007) 
Utah UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2C-1210(2)(e) (LexisNexis 
2007) 
Vermont VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §3101(5)(c) (LexisNexis 2007) 
Comment c 
Virginia VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1047 (LexisNexis 2007) 
Washington WASH. REV. CODE. §§ 25.15.275 (LexisNexis 2008) 
Comment d 
West Virginia W.VA. CODE §§ 31B-8-801(b)(5)(i),(ii), and (iii) 
(LexisNexis 2007) Comment a 
Wisconsin WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 183.0902(1) (LexisNexis 2006)  
Wyoming WYO. STAT. §§ 17-29-701 (2010)  Comment e 
 
a. Economic purpose unreasonably frustrated, another member makes 
it not reasonably practical to continue, or it is not otherwise 
reasonably practical to continue.  Note that West Virginia also gives 
certain rights to transferees. 
b. Not reasonably practicable to carry on in conformity with articles of 
organization or agreement. 
c. Economic purpose unreasonably frustrated; not otherwise 
practicable to carry on. 
d. Not reasonably practicable to carry on in conformity with agreement 
or other circumstances render dissolution equitable. 
e. Applies to LLCs that have not elected to be a closely held LLC 
under Wyoming‘s Close Limited Liability Company Supplement.  
For LLCs that have elected close LLC status, dissolution occurs 
only upon the expiration of the period fixed for the duration of the 
company, the unanimous agreement of all members, or upon the 
occurrence of events specified in the operating agreement. WYO. 
STAT. §§ 17-25-108 (2010). 
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APPENDIX D 
§ 14.34. Election to Purchase in Lieu of Dissolution. 
 
(a) In a proceeding under section 14.30(2) to dissolve a corporation that has no 
shares listed on a national securities exchange or regularly traded in a market 
maintained by one or more members of a national or affiliated securities 
association, the corporation may elect or, if it fails to elect, one or more 
shareholders may elect to purchase all shares owned by the petitioning shareholder 
at the fair value of the shares. An election pursuant to this section shall be 
irrevocable unless the court determines that it is equitable to set aside or modify 
the election. 
 
(b) An election to purchase pursuant to this section may be filed with the court at 
any time within 90 days after the filing of the petition under section 14.30(2) or at 
such later time as the court in its discretion may allow. If the election to purchase 
is filed by one or more shareholders, the corporation shall, within 10 days 
thereafter, give written notice to all shareholders, other than the petitioner. The 
notice must state the name and number of shares owned by the petitioner and the 
name and number of shares owned by each electing shareholder and must advise 
the recipients of their right to join in the election to purchase shares in accordance 
with this section. Shareholders who wish to participate must file notice of their 
intention to join in the purchase no later than 30 days after the effective date of the 
notice to them. All shareholders who have filed an election or notice of their 
intention to participate in the election to purchase thereby become parties to the 
proceeding and shall participate in the purchase in proportion to their ownership of 
shares as of the date the first election was filed, unless they otherwise agree or the 
court otherwise directs. After an election has been filed by the corporation or one 
or more shareholders, the proceeding under section 14.30(2) may not be 
discontinued or settled, nor may the petitioning shareholder sell or otherwise 
dispose of his shares, unless the court determines that it would be equitable to the 
corporation and the shareholders, other than the petitioner, to permit such 
discontinuance, settlement, sale, or other disposition. 
 
(c) If, within 60 days of the filing of the first election, the parties reach agreement 
as to the fair value and terms of purchase of the petitioner‘s shares, the court shall 
enter an order directing the purchase of petitioner‘s shares upon the terms and 
conditions agreed to by the parties. 
 
(d) If the parties are unable to reach an agreement as provided for in subsection (c), 
the court, upon application of any party, shall stay the section 14.30(2) proceedings 
and determine the fair value of the petitioner‘s shares as of the day before the date 
on which the petition under section 14.30(2) was filed or as of such other date as 
the court deems appropriate under the circumstances. 
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(e) Upon determining the fair value of the shares, the court shall enter an order 
directing the purchase upon such terms and conditions as the court deems 
appropriate, which may include payment of the purchase price in installments, 
where necessary in the interest of equity, provision for security to assure payment 
of the purchase price and any additional costs, fees, and expenses as may have 
been awarded, and, if the shares are to be purchased by shareholders, the allocation 
of shares among them. In allocating petitioner‘s shares among holders of different 
classes of shares, the court should attempt to preserve the existing distribution of 
voting rights among holders of different classes insofar as practicable and may 
direct that holders of a specific class or classes shall not participate in the purchase. 
Interest may be allowed at the rate and from the date determined by the court to be 
equitable, but if the court finds that the refusal of the petitioning shareholder to 
accept an offer of payment was arbitrary or otherwise not in good faith, no interest 
shall be allowed. If the court finds that the petitioning shareholder had probable 
grounds for relief under paragraphs (ii) or (iv) of section 14.30(2), it may award to 
the petitioning shareholder reasonable fees and expenses of counsel and of any 
experts employed by him. 
 
(f) Upon entry of an order under subsections (c) or (e), the court shall dismiss the 
petition to dissolve the corporation under section 14.30, and the petitioning 
shareholder shall no longer have any rights or status as a shareholder of the 
corporation, except the right to receive the amounts awarded to him by the order of 
the court which shall be enforceable in the same manner as any other judgment. 
 
(g) The purchase ordered pursuant to subsection (e), shall be made within 10 days 
after the date the order becomes final unless before that time the corporation files 
with the court a notice of its intention to adopt articles of dissolution pursuant to 
sections 14.02 and 14.03, which articles must then be adopted and filed within 50 
days thereafter. Upon filing of such articles of dissolution, the corporation shall be 
dissolved in accordance with the provisions of section 14.05 through 14.07, and 
the order entered pursuant to subsection (e) shall no longer be of any force or 
effect, except that the court may award the petitioning shareholder reasonable fees 
and expenses in accordance with the provisions of the last sentence of subsection 
(e) and the petitioner may continue to pursue any claims previously asserted on 
behalf of the corporation. 
 
(h) Any payment by the corporation pursuant to an order under subsections (c) or 
(e), other than an award of fees and expenses pursuant to subsection (e), is subject 
to the provisions of section 6.40. 
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APPENDIX E 
LLC, Corporate, and Partnership Statutes Authorizing a Judicial 
Dissolution  
STATE 
JUDICIAL DISSOLUTION 
AUTHORIZED BUT 
SILENT ON BUY-OUT 
BUY-OUT AT “FAIR 
MARKET VALUE” OR 
CONTAINING OTHER 
BUY-OUT LANGUAGE 
BUY-OUT AT “FAIR 
VALUE” 
Alabama LLC  ALA. CODE ANN. § 10-12-38 
(LexisNexis 2007) 
  
Alabama 
Corporate 
ALA. CODE § 10-2B-14.30 
(LexisNexis 2007) 
  
Alabama 
Partnership 
  ALA. CODE § 10A-8-
7.01 (effective Jan 1, 
2011).  Departs from 
RUPA language, 
providing for a buyout 
at ―fair value.‖  
Alaska LLC 
 
ALASKA CODE § 10.50.405 
(LexisNexis 2007) 
  
Alaska Corporate 
 
  ALASKA CODE § 
10.06.628 (LexisNexis 
2008) and 10.06.630 
(LexisNexis 2008)** 
Alaska 
Partnership 
 ALASKA CODE § 32.06.70 
(2010) 
Other Language: Follows 
RUPA § 7.01. 
Buyout at greater of the 
liquidation value or the amount 
distributable to the dissociating 
partner had the partnership 
been sold without dissociating 
partner. 
 
Arizona LLC Ariz. Rev. Stat 
Ann. § 29-785 A.1-A.4 
  
Arizona 
Corporate 
 
  ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-
1430 & §10.1434 
(LexisNexis 2008) 
Authorizes buyout but 
doesn‘t specify the 
value. 
 
 
 
 
MILLERFINALIZED_TWO (DO NOT DELETE) 4/28/2011  7:33 PM 
664 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 13:3 
 
STATE 
JUDICIAL  
DISSOLUTION 
AUTHORIZED BUT 
SILENT ON BUY-OUT 
BUY-OUT AT “FAIR 
MARKET VALUE” OR 
CONTAINING OTHER 
BUY-OUT LANGUAGE 
BUY-OUT AT “FAIR 
VALUE” 
Arizona 
Partnership  
   
Arkansas LLC ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-902 
(LexisNexis 2007) 
  
Arkansas 
Corporate  
ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-1430 
(LexisNexis 2008) 
  
Arkansas 
Partnership 
 ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-46-701 
(2009) 
Other Language: 
Follows RUPA § 7.01. 
Buyout at greater of the 
liquidation value or the amount 
distributable to the dissociating 
partner had the partnership 
been sold as a going concern 
without the dissociating 
partner. 
 
California LLC   CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 
17351 & § 17604 (2010) 
 
 
California 
Corporate 
 
  Cal. Corp. Code 
§ 1800 & 2000** 
California 
Partnership  
 CAL. CORP. CODE § 16701 
(Deering 2009) 
Other Language: Follows 
RUPA § 7.01. 
Buyout at greater of the 
liquidation value or the amount 
distributable to the dissociating 
partner had the partnership 
been sold as a going concern 
without dissociated partner. 
 
Colorado LLC COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-
80-810 (LexisNexis 2007) 
  
Colorado 
Corporate  
COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-114-
301 (LexisNexis 2007) 
  
Colorado 
Partnership  
 COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-64-701 
(2009) 
Buyout price is the amount 
equal to the value of the 
partner‘s interest.   
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STATE 
JUDICIAL DISSOLUTION 
AUTHORIZED BUT 
SILENT ON BUY-OUT 
BUY-OUT AT “FAIR 
MARKET VALUE” OR 
CONTAINING OTHER 
BUY-OUT LANGUAGE 
BUY-OUT AT “FAIR 
VALUE” 
Connecticut LLC CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-
207 (West 2007) 
  
Connecticut 
Corporate 
  CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 33-900 (West 
2008)** 
Connecticut 
Partnership  
 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 34-
362(2009) 
Other Language: Follows 
RUPA § 7.01. 
Buyout at greater of the 
liquidation value or the amount 
distributable to the dissociating 
partner had the partnership 
been sold as a going concern 
without the dissociated partner.  
 
Delaware LLC DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 18-
802 
  
Delaware 
Corporate  
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8  § 273 
(LexisNexis 2008) 
  
Delaware 
Partnership  
  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 
15-701 (2010) Buyout 
at fair value of such 
partner‘s economic 
interest as of the date of 
dissociation based on 
the partner‘s right to 
share in distributions.   
District of 
Columbia LLC  
D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-1048 
(LexisNexis 2008) 
  
District of 
Columbia 
Corporate  
D.C.CODE ANN. § 29-101.88 
(LexisNexis 2008) 
  
District of 
Columbia 
Partnership 
 D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-107.01 
(2010). Other Language: 
Follows RUPA § 7.01. 
Buyout at greater of the 
liquidation value or the amount 
distributable to the dissociating 
partner had the partnership 
been sold as a going concern 
without dissociating partner.  
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STATE 
JUDICIAL DISSOLUTION 
AUTHORIZED BUT 
SILENT ON BUY-OUT 
BUY-OUT AT “FAIR 
MARKET VALUE” OR 
CONTAINING OTHER 
BUY-OUT LANGUAGE 
BUY-OUT AT “FAIR 
VALUE” 
Florida LLC  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
608.449(2)(a)-(b) * 
 
  
Florida Corporate   Fla. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 607.1430, 607.1434, 
and 607.1436(2010) * 
Florida 
Partnership  
 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 620.8701 
(2010) 
Other Language: Follows 
RUPA § 7.01. 
Buyout at greater of the 
liquidation value or the amount 
distributable to the dissociating 
partner had the partnership 
been sold as a going concern 
without dissociated partner. 
 
Georgia LLC GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-
603(a) (LexisNexis 2007) 
But see GA. CODE ANN. § 14-
11-1108 (2008) Provides 
Dissenters‘ Rights at fair 
value. 
  
Georgia 
Corporate 
GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-1430 
(LexisNexis 2008) 
  
Georgia 
Partnership  
 GA. CODE ANN. § 14-8-42 
(2010) 
Other Language: 
―The withdrawn partner or 
legal representative . . . shall 
receive . . . an amount equal to 
the value of his interest.‖ 
 
Hawaii LLC  HAW. REV. STAT. tit. 23A, §§ 
428-801 (LexisNexis 2008) 
  
Hawaii Corporate    HAW. REV. STAT. tit. 23, 
§§ 411-414 & 414-415 
(LexisNexis 2008) ** 
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STATE 
JUDICIAL DISSOLUTION 
AUTHORIZED BUT 
SILENT ON BUY-OUT 
BUY-OUT AT “FAIR 
MARKET VALUE” OR 
CONTAINING OTHER 
BUY-OUT LANGUAGE 
BUY-OUT AT “FAIR 
VALUE” 
Hawaii 
Partnership 
 HAW. REV. STAT. tit. 23, § 425-
133 (LexisNexis 2010) 
Other Language: Follows 
RUPA § 7.01. 
Buyout at greater of the 
liquidation value or the amount 
distributable to the dissociating 
partner had the partnership 
been sold as a going concern 
without dissociated partner. 
 
Idaho LLC  ID CODE ANN. §§ 53-643 
(2008) 
  
Idaho Corporate    ID CODE ANN. §S 30-1-
1430 & §30-1-1434 
(LexisNexis 2008) ** 
Idaho Partnership   ID CODE ANN. § 53-3-701 
(2010) 
Other Language: Follows 
RUPA § 7.01. 
Buyout at greater of the 
liquidation value or the amount 
distributable to the dissociating 
partner had the partnership 
been sold as a going concern 
without dissociated partner. 
 
 
Illinois LLC    805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 180/35-60 &  
180/35-65 (LexisNexis 
2008)** 
Allows for reasonable 
expenses if arbitrary, 
vexatious or conduct 
not in good faith.  
Illinois Corporate   805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 5/12.55 & 
5/12.56 (LexisNexis 
2008) ***** 
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STATE 
JUDICIAL DISSOLUTION 
AUTHORIZED BUT SILENT ON 
BUY-OUT 
BUY-OUT AT “FAIR 
MARKET VALUE” OR 
CONTAINING OTHER 
BUY-OUT LANGUAGE 
BUY-OUT AT 
“FAIR VALUE” 
Illinois 
Partnership  
 Other Language: Follows 
RUPA § 7.01. 
Buyout at greater of the 
liquidation value or the 
amount distributable to the 
dissociating partner had 
the partnership been sold 
as a going concern without 
dissociated partner. 
 
Indiana LLC  IND. CODE ANN. § 23-18-2 
(LexisNexis 2008) 
  
Indiana 
Corporate 
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-47-1 
(LexisNexis 2008)  
  
Indiana 
Partnership  
 IND. CODE ANN. § 23-4-1-
42 (2010) 
Unif. P‘ship Act 
Other Language: Upon 
retirement or death . . . 
right to the ―value of his 
interest.‖  
 
Iowa LLC  IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.1302 
(LexisNexis 2008) 
  
Iowa 
Corporate 
  IOWA CODE ANN. 
§§ 490.1430 & 
490/1434 (2008) ** 
Iowa 
Partnership  
 IOWA CODE ANN. § 
486A.701(2010) 
Other Language: Follows 
RUPA § 7.01. 
Buyout at greater of the 
liquidation value or the 
amount distributable to the 
dissociating partner had 
the partnership been sold 
as a going concern without 
dissociated partner. 
 
Kansas LLC  KANSAS STAT. ANN. §§ 17-76, 117 
(LexisNexis 2008) 
  
Kansas 
Corporate 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6808 
(LexisNexis 2007) General 
authority to dissolve but no specific 
oppression or deadlock triggers. 
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STATE 
JUDICIAL DISSOLUTION 
AUTHORIZED BUT 
SILENT ON BUY-OUT 
BUY-OUT AT “FAIR 
MARKET VALUE” OR 
CONTAINING OTHER BUY-
OUT LANGUAGE 
BUY-OUT AT 
“FAIR VALUE” 
Kansas 
Partnership  
 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-701 
(2009). Other Language: 
Follows RUPA §7.01. 
Buyout at greater of the 
liquidation value or the amount 
distributable to the dissociating 
partner had the partnership been 
sold as a going concern without 
dissociated partner. 
 
Kentucky LLC  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
275.290 (LexisNexis 2008) 
  
Kentucky 
Corporate  
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
271B.14-300 (LexisNexis 
2008) 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362.355 
(2010)  
 
Kentucky 
Partnership  
 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.355 
(2010). Other Language: Upon 
retirement or death . . . right to 
the ―value of his interest.‖ 
 
Louisiana LLC LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
12:1335 (LexisNexis 2008) 
  
Louisiana 
Corporate  
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:143 
(LexisNexis 2008) 
  
Maine LLC ME. REV. STAT. tit. 31, § 702 
(LexisNexis 2008) 
  
Maine Corporate    ME. REV. STAT. tit. 
13-C, § 1430 
(LexisNexis 2008) 
and ME. REV. 
STAT. tit. 13-C 
§1434 (LexisNexis 
2008) *** 
Maine Partnership  ME. REV. STAT.tit. 31 §1071 
(2009). Other Language: 
Follows RUPA § 7.01. 
Buyout at greater of the 
liquidation value or the amount 
distributable to the dissociating 
partner had the partnership been 
sold as a going concern without 
dissociated partner. 
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STATE 
JUDICIAL DISSOLUTION 
AUTHORIZED BUT 
SILENT ON BUY-OUT 
BUY-OUT AT “FAIR 
MARKET VALUE” OR 
CONTAINING OTHER BUY-
OUT LANGUAGE 
BUY-OUT AT 
“FAIR VALUE” 
Maryland LLC  MD. CODE ANN. § 4A-903 
(LexisNexis 2008) 
  
Maryland 
Corporate 
MD. CODE ANN. § 3-413 
(LexisNexis 2008) 
  
  MD. CODE ANN. § 9A-701 
(2010) 
Other Language: Follows RUPA 
§ 7.01. 
Buyout greater of the liquidation 
value or the amount 
distributable to the dissociating 
partner had the partnership been 
sold as a going concern without 
dissociated partner. 
 
 
Massachusetts 
LLC 
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156C, 
§ 44 (LexisNexis 2008) 
  
Massachusetts 
Corporate  
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156D, 
§ 14.30 (LexisNexis 2008) 
 
  
Massachusetts 
Partnership  
 MASS. ANN. LAWSch.  108A  § 
42 (2010) 
Other Language: 
Upon retirement or death ―right 
to the value of his interest.‖  
 
Michigan LLC  MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
450.4802 (LexisNexis 2008) 
  
Michigan 
Corporate  
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 
450.1823 (LexisNexis 2008) 
 
  
Michigan 
Partnership 
 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 449.42 
(2010) 
Other Language: Retiring or 
deceased partner entitled to the 
―value of his interest.‖ 
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STATE 
JUDICIAL DISSOLUTION 
AUTHORIZED BUT SILENT 
ON BUY-OUT 
BUY-OUT AT “FAIR 
MARKET VALUE” OR 
CONTAINING OTHER 
BUY-OUT LANGUAGE 
BUY-OUT AT 
“FAIR VALUE” 
Minnesota LLC    MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
322B.833 (LexisNexis 
2008)** 
See also § 322B.386 
(2007) 
Provides Dissenters‘ 
Rights at fair value. 
 
Minnesota 
Corporate  
  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
302A.751 (LexisNexis 
2007)** 
Minnesota 
Partnership  
 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
323A.0701 (2009) 
Other Language: 
Follows RUPA § 7.01. Buyout 
greater of the liquidation value 
or the amount distributable to 
the dissociating partner had the 
partnership been sold as a 
going concern without 
dissociated partner. 
 
 
Mississippi LLC  MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-29-802 
(LexisNexis 2008) 
  
Mississippi 
Corporate 
 
  MISS. CODE ANN. § 
79-4-14.34 
(LexisNexis 2008)** 
Mississippi 
Partnership  
 MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-13-701 
(2010) 
Other Language: Follows 
RUPA § 7.01. 
Buyout greater of the 
liquidation value or the 
amount distributable to the 
dissociating partner had the 
partnership been sold as a 
going concern without 
dissociated partner.  
 
Missouri LLC  MO. ANN. STAT. § 347.143 
(LexisNexis 2008)  
  
Missouri 
Corporate  
MO. ANN. STAT. § 351.494 
(LexisNexis 2008) 
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STATE 
JUDICIAL DISSOLUTION 
AUTHORIZED BUT SILENT 
ON BUY-OUT 
BUY-OUT AT “FAIR 
MARKET VALUE” OR 
CONTAINING OTHER 
BUY-OUT LANGUAGE 
BUY-OUT AT 
“FAIR VALUE” 
Missouri 
Partnership  
 MO. ANN. STAT. § 358.420 
(2010) 
Other Language: Retiring or 
deceased partner entitled to the 
value of his interest.  
 
Montana LLC  MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-902 
(LexisNexis 2008) 
  
Montana 
Corporate  
  MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 
35-1-938 & §35-1-939 
(LexisNexis 2008) ** 
Montana 
Partnership  
 MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-10-
619 (2009) 
Formulation Similar to That in 
Fed. Income Tax Reg. 
20.2031-3: Buy out at greater 
of liquidation value or value 
based on sale of entire 
business as going concern with 
selling price determined on the 
basis of the amount that would 
be paid by a willing buyer to a 
willing seller, neither being 
under any compulsion to buy 
or sell, and with knowledge of 
relevant fact. 
 
Nebraska LLC  NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-
2622 (LexisNexis 2008) 
  
Nebraska 
Corporate 
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-
20,162 (LexisNexis 2008) 
  
Nebraska 
Partnership  
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 67-434 
(LexisNexis 2010)  
Other Language: Follows 
RUPA § 7.01. 
Buyout greater of the 
liquidation value or the 
amount distributable to the 
dissociating partner had the 
partnership been sold as a 
going concern without 
dissociated partner. 
 
Nevada LLC  NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.495 
(LexisNexis 2008) 
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STATE 
JUDICIAL DISSOLUTION 
AUTHORIZED BUT SILENT 
ON BUY-OUT 
BUY-OUT AT “FAIR 
MARKET VALUE” OR 
CONTAINING OTHER 
BUY-OUT LANGUAGE 
BUY-OUT AT 
“FAIR VALUE” 
Nevada Corporate  NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78-605 
(LexisNexis 2008) 
Generalized court  authority. 
  
Nevada 
Partnership  
 Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
87.4346 (2009) 
Other Language: Follows 
RUPA § 7.01. 
Buyout greater of the 
liquidation value or the 
amount distributable to the 
dissociating partner had the 
partnership been sold as a 
going concern without 
dissociated partner. 
 
New Hampshire 
LLC  
N.H.REV. STAT. ANN. § 304:C-
51 (LexisNexis 2008) 
  
New Hampshire 
Corporate 
  N.H.REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 293-A:14:30 & 
14.34 (LexisNexis 
2008)** 
New Hampshire 
Partnership  
 N.H.Rev. Stat. Ann. § 304-
A:42 (2010) 
Other Language: Retiring or 
deceased partner entitled to the 
value of his interest. 
 
New Jersey LLC  N.J.REV. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-
49 (LexisNexis 2008) 
  
New Jersey 
Corporate 
  N.J.REV. STAT. ANN. § 
14A:12-7 (LexisNexis 
2008)** 
Allows for 
marketability 
discount; Balsamadies 
v. Protameen 
Chemicals, Inc., 734 
A. 2d 721(N.J. 1999 ), 
rev‘g 712 A. 2d 
673(N.J. Super. App. 
Div. 1998). 
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STATE 
JUDICIAL DISSOLUTION 
AUTHORIZED BUT SILENT 
ON BUY-OUT 
BUY-OUT AT “FAIR 
MARKET VALUE” OR 
CONTAINING OTHER 
BUY-OUT LANGUAGE 
BUY-OUT AT 
“FAIR VALUE” 
New Jersey 
Partnership  
  N.J.REV. STAT. ANN. § 
42:1A-34 (2010) 
Buyout at fair value as 
of the date of 
withdrawal based on 
the right to share in 
distributions from the 
partnership unless the 
partnership agreement 
provides for a 
different fair value 
formula.  
New Mexico LLC  N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-40 
(LexisNexis 2008)  
  
New Mexico 
Corporate  
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-16-16 
(LexisNexis 2008)  
  
New Mexico 
Partnership  
 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 54-1A-701 
(LexisNexis 2009) 
Other Language: Follows 
RUPA § 7.01.   
Buyout greater of the 
liquidation value or the 
amount distributable to the 
dissociating partner had the 
partnership been sold as a 
going concern without 
dissociated partner. 
 
New York LLC N.Y.LT. LIAB. CO. LAW § 702 
(LexisNexis 2008)  
  
New York 
Corporate 
 
  N.Y. BUS. CORP. §§ 
1104 & 1104A  for 
dissolution & §1118 
for buy-out in lieu of 
dissolution. ** 
Allows marketability 
discount; Raskin v. 
Walter Karl, Inc., 514 
N.Y. S 2d 120 (N.Y. 
App. 1987). 
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STATE 
JUDICIAL DISSOLUTION 
AUTHORIZED BUT SILENT 
ON BUY-OUT 
BUY-OUT AT “FAIR 
MARKET VALUE” OR 
CONTAINING OTHER 
BUY-OUT LANGUAGE 
BUY-OUT AT 
“FAIR VALUE” 
New York 
Partnership  
 N.Y. PARTNERSHIP 73 
(LexisNexis 2010) 
Other Language: Retiring or 
deceased partner entitled to the 
value of his interest. 
Note: See Vick v. Albert, 849 
N.Y.S. 2d 250(App. Div. 
2008) (minority and 
marketability discounts 
unavailable; buy out of retiring 
partner doesn‘t raise same 
issues as in corporate appraisal 
statute).   
 
North Carolina 
LLC  
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-6-02 
(LexisNexis 2008)  
  
North Carolina 
Corporate  
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-30 
(LexisNexis 2008)  
  
North Carolina 
Partnership  
 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-72 
(LexisNexis 2010) 
Other Language: Retiring or 
deceased partner entitled to the 
value of his interest.  
 
North Dakota 
LLC 
  N.D. CENT. CODE § 
10-32-119 
(LexisNexis 2008)  
See also N.D. Cent. 
Code §10-32-54 
(LexisNexis 2008) 
Provides Dissenters‘ 
Rights at fair value. 
North Dakota 
Corporate 
 
  N.D.Cent. Code 
§ 10-19.1-115 
(LexisNexis 2008) 
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STATE 
JUDICIAL DISSOLUTION 
AUTHORIZED BUT SILENT 
ON BUY-OUT 
BUY-OUT AT “FAIR 
MARKET VALUE” OR 
CONTAINING OTHER 
BUY-OUT LANGUAGE 
BUY-OUT AT 
“FAIR VALUE” 
North Dakota 
Partnership 
 N.D.Cent. Code 
§ 45-19-01 (2010). Other 
Language: Follows RUPA § 
7.01. Buyout greater of the 
liquidation value or the 
amount distributable to the 
dissociating partner had the 
partnership been sold as a 
going concern without 
dissociated partner. 
 
Ohio LLC  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
1705.47 (LexisNexis 2008) 
But see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§1705.41(2008) Provides 
Dissenters‘ Rights at fair cash 
value. 
  
Ohio Corporate 
 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
1701.91 (LexisNexis 2008)  
  
Ohio Partnership   OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
1776.54 (LexisNexis 2010) 
Other Language: 
Based on RUPA. Treated as if 
partnership sold the assets at a 
price equal to the greater of the 
liquidation value or value 
based on the sale of the entire 
business as a going concern 
without dissociated partner.   
 
Oklahoma LLC  OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, ch. 14, § 
2038 (LexisNexis 2008)  
  
Oklahoma 
Corporate  
OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, ch. 22, § 
1094 (LexisNexis 2008)  
  
Oklahoma 
Partnership  
 OKLA. STAT. tit. 54, ch. 1, § 
1.701 (LexisNexis 2009) 
Other Language: Follows 
RUPA § 7.01. 
Buyout greater of the 
liquidation value or the 
amount distributable to the 
dissociating partner had the 
partnership been sold as a 
going concern without 
dissociated partner. 
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STATE 
JUDICIAL DISSOLUTION 
AUTHORIZED BUT SILENT 
ON BUY-OUT 
BUY-OUT AT “FAIR 
MARKET VALUE” OR 
CONTAINING OTHER 
BUY-OUT LANGUAGE 
BUY-OUT AT 
“FAIR VALUE” 
Oregon LLC  OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 63.661 
(2007) 
  
Oregon Corporate  OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.661 
(2007). 
  
Oregon 
Partnership  
  OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
67.250 (LexisNexis 
2009) 
Departs from RUPA 
Language: 
Buyout price is an 
amount equal to the 
fair value of the 
dissociated partner‘s 
interest . . . If the 
partner has a minority 
interest . . . the buyout 
price . . . shall not be 
discounted.  
Pennsylvania 
LLC  
  PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 8933 and 8972 
(LexisNexis 2007) 
Judicial dissolution 
tied to not reasonably 
practicable standard 
but provides for 
distribution at fair 
value upon 
dissociation from 
LLC.  
Pennsylvania 
Corporate  
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1981 
(LexisNexis 2007)  
  
Pennsylvania 
Partnership  
 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8364 
(LexisNexis 2009) 
Other Language: Retiring or 
deceased partner entitled to the 
value of his interest.  
 
Rhode Island LLC  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-40 
(LexisNexis 2008)  
  
Rhode Island 
Corporate  
  R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-
1.2-1314 (LexisNexis 
2008) & §7-1.2-1315 
(LexisNexis 2008)** 
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STATE 
JUDICIAL DISSOLUTION 
AUTHORIZED BUT SILENT 
ON BUY-OUT 
BUY-OUT AT “FAIR 
MARKET VALUE” OR 
CONTAINING OTHER 
BUY-OUT LANGUAGE 
BUY-OUT AT 
“FAIR VALUE” 
Rhode Island 
Partnership  
 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-12-53 
(LexisNexis 2010) Other 
Language: Retiring or 
deceased partner entitled to the 
value of his interest.  
 
South Carolina 
LLC  
S. C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-801 
(LexisNexis 2008) **** 
  
South Carolina 
Corporate  
S. C. CODE ANN. § 33-14-300 
(LexisNexis 2008)  
  
South Carolina 
Partnership  
 S. C. CODE ANN. § 33-41-1080 
(LexisNexis 2009) 
Other Language: Retiring or 
deceased partner entitled to the 
value of his interest.   
 
South Dakota 
LLC  
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-34A-
801(a)(4)(iv) (LexisNexis 
2008)  
  
South Dakota 
Corporate  
  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 
47-1A-1430 
(LexisNexis 2008) & 
for purchase 47-1A-
1434 to 47-1A-1434.7 
(LexisNexis 2008) ** 
South Dakota 
Partnership  
 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 48-7A-
701 (LexisNexis 2009)  
 
Tennessee LLC    TENN. CODE ANN. § 
48-249-617 
(LexisNexis 2008) 
Authorizes judicial 
dissolution and 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 
48-249-503 and 48-
249-506 (LexisNexis 
2008) provide 
guidelines as to 
purchase (containing 
valuation provisions at 
fair value where a 
member‘s interest has 
been terminated).   
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STATE 
JUDICIAL DISSOLUTION 
AUTHORIZED BUT SILENT 
ON BUY-OUT 
BUY-OUT AT “FAIR 
MARKET VALUE” OR 
CONTAINING OTHER 
BUY-OUT LANGUAGE 
BUY-OUT AT 
“FAIR VALUE” 
Tennessee 
Corporate  
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-24-301 
(LexisNexis 2008)  
  
Tennessee 
Partnership  
 TENN. CODE ANN. § 61-1-701 
(LexisNexis 2010) 
Other Language: Follows 
RUPA § 7.01. 
Buyout greater of the 
liquidation value or the 
amount distributable to the 
dissociating partner had the 
partnership been sold as a 
going concern without 
dissociated partner.  
 
Texas LLC  TEX. BUS. ORG. CODE ANN. § 
11.314 (LexisNexis 2007)  
  
Texas Corporate    
Texas Partnership    TEX. BUS. ORG. CODE 
ANN. § 10.354 
(LexisNexis 2010) 
Uses ―fair value‖ in 
Dissenters‘ rights 
provision.  Comment 
indicates no 
substantive change 
was intended in 
Dissenters‘ rights. See 
also TEX. BUS. CORP. 
ACT § 5.12 (2009) ** 
Provides payment to 
dissenters based on 
fair value without 
consideration of 
control premium, 
minority discount, or 
marketability 
discount.   
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STATE 
JUDICIAL DISSOLUTION 
AUTHORIZED BUT SILENT 
ON BUY-OUT 
BUY-OUT AT “FAIR 
MARKET VALUE” OR 
CONTAINING OTHER 
BUY-OUT LANGUAGE 
BUY-OUT AT 
“FAIR VALUE” 
Utah LLC   UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2C-
1210 & 48-2C-1214 
(LexisNexis 2008) Provision 
to purchase in lieu of 
dissolution at fair market 
value. 
 
Utah Corporate 
 
  UTAH CODE ANN. § 
16-10a-1430 
(LexisNexis 2008) 
Provision to purchase 
in lieu of dissolution 
at fair value at 16-10a-
1434 (Lexis Nexis 
2008). ** See also 16-
10a-1330. 
Utah Partnership   UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-1-39 
(LexisNexis 2010) Other 
Language: Retiring or 
deceased partner entitled to the 
value of his interest.   
 
Vermont LLC  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3101 
(LexisNexis 2007)  
  
Vermont 
Corporate  
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A § 1430 
(LexisNexis 2007)  
  
Vermont 
Partnership 
 Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11 
§ 3261 (LexisNexis 2010) 
Other Language: Follows 
RUPA § 7.01. 
Buyout greater of the 
liquidation value or the 
amount distributable to the 
dissociating partner had the 
partnership been sold as a 
going concern without 
dissociated partner.  
 
Virginia LLC  VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1047 
(LexisNexis 2008) 
  
Virginia 
Corporate  
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-747 
(LexisNexis 2008)  
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STATE 
JUDICIAL DISSOLUTION 
AUTHORIZED BUT SILENT 
ON BUY-OUT 
BUY-OUT AT “FAIR 
MARKET VALUE” OR 
CONTAINING OTHER 
BUY-OUT LANGUAGE 
BUY-OUT AT 
“FAIR VALUE” 
Virginia 
Partnership  
 VA. CODE ANN. § 150-73-112 
(LexisNexis 2010) Other 
Language: Follows RUPA § 
7.01. 
Buyout greater of the 
liquidation value or the 
amount distributable to the 
dissociating partner had the 
partnership been sold as a 
going concern without 
dissociated partner.  
 
Washington LLC  WASH. REV. CODE § 25.15.275 
(LexisNexis 2008) But see § 
25.15.430 (LexisNexis 2008) 
Provides Dissenters‘ Rights at 
fair value. 
  
Washington 
Corporate  
WASH. REV. CODE § 
23B.14.300 (LexisNexis 2008)  
  
Washington 
Partnership  
 WASH. REV. CODE § 25.05.425 
(LexisNexis 2010) 
Other Language: Follows 
RUPA § 7.01. 
Buyout greater of the 
liquidation value or the 
amount distributable to the 
dissociating partner had the 
partnership been sold as a 
going concern without 
dissociated partner.  
See also partnership 
dissenters‘ provisions 
requiring payment at 
―fair value‖ under §§ 
25.05.420 - 25.05.475 
(LexisNexis 2010).  
West Virginia 
LLC  
W.VA. CODE § 31B-1-
801(b)(5)(v) (LexisNexis 2008)  
  
West Virginia 
Corporate  
  W.VA. CODE § 31D-
14-1430 (LexisNexis 
2008) 
Provision for purchase 
in lieu of dissolution 
at § 31D-14-1434 ** 
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STATE 
JUDICIAL DISSOLUTION 
AUTHORIZED BUT SILENT 
ON BUY-OUT 
BUY-OUT AT “FAIR 
MARKET VALUE” OR 
CONTAINING OTHER 
BUY-OUT LANGUAGE 
BUY-OUT AT 
“FAIR VALUE” 
West Virginia 
Partnership 
 W.VA. CODE § 47B-7-1 
(LexisNexis 2009) 
Other Language: Follows 
RUPA § 7.01. 
Buyout greater of the 
liquidation value or the 
amount distributable to the 
dissociating partner had the 
partnership been sold as a 
going concern without 
dissociated partner. 
 
Wisconsin LLC  WIS. STAT. ANN. § 183.0902 
(LexisNexis 2007)  
  
Wisconsin 
Corporate  
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.1430 
(LexisNexis 2007)  
  
Wisconsin 
Partnership  
 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 178.37 
(LexisNexis 2009) 
Other Language: Retiring or 
deceased partner entitled to the 
value of his interest.   
 
Wyoming LLC 
 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-29-701 
(LexisNexis 2010) Authorizes 
judicial dissolution but offers 
no guidance on value. 
However LLCs electing close 
LLC status lack express 
statutory authorization for 
judicial dissolution.  WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 17-25-103 
(LexisNexis 2010) 
 
  
Wyoming 
Corporate  
  WYO. STAT. ANN. § 
17-16-1430 
(LexisNexis 2007) 
Provision for purchase 
in lieu of dissolution 
at §17-16-1434 
(LexisNexis 2007). ** 
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STATE 
JUDICIAL DISSOLUTION 
AUTHORIZED BUT SILENT 
ON BUY-OUT 
BUY-OUT AT “FAIR 
MARKET VALUE” OR 
CONTAINING OTHER 
BUY-OUT LANGUAGE 
BUY-OUT AT 
“FAIR VALUE” 
Wyoming 
Partnership  
 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-21-701 
(LexisNexis 2010) 
Supplements  RUPA language, 
providing for a buyout price 
equal to the greater of the 
amount that would have been 
distributable if the assets were 
sold at the greater of 
liquidation value or the value 
based on the sale as a going 
concern, and indicating that in 
either case, the sale price of 
the partnership assets shall be 
determined on the basis of the 
amount that would be paid by 
a willing buyer to a willing 
seller, neither being under any 
compulsion to buy or sell, and 
with knowledge of all relevant 
facts.   
 
 
* Cf. Florida‘s LLC statutory appraisal rights at FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 608.4351 (LexisNexis 2008) (disregarding expressly minority 
or marketability discounts for LLCs with ten or fewer members 
but providing no statutory guidance on valuation for LLCs with 
more than ten members).  Florida‘s corporate appraisal rights at 
FLA. STAT. ANN. §608.1301 similarly require the minority and 
marketability discounts to be disregarded for corporations with 
ten or fewer shareholders, but remain silent on valuation for 
corporations with more than ten shareholders. 
** Election to purchase in lieu of dissolution. 
*** Gives court discretion to provide remedies and one of the 
remedies listed includes purchase at fair value. 
**** Note that 33-44-701 contains provisions for purchasing a 
member‘s interest at fair value. 
***** Without reduction for minority discount or absent 
extraordinary circumstances, without a discount for lack of 
marketability. 
